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Mozambican Illegal Debts:
Testing the Odious Debt Doctrine
Mauro Megliani*
ABSTRACT

In June 2019, the Constitutional Council of Mozambique
delivered a judgment declaringa financial transactionarranged
by the government in violation of the parliamentaryprerogatives
in budgetary matters unconstitutional. This was only the tip of an

iceberg consisting of a series of transactions tainted with
corruption. In the face of this illegality, many antidebt
campaigners have invoked the application of the odious debt
doctrine to block the enforcement of contractualclaims and the
availability of restitutionary remedies. Under the odious debt

doctrine, a debt is odious if, in the awarenessof the creditors, it is
contracted without the consent of and not for the benefit of the
population. The operationof the odious debt doctrine presupposes
an inquiry into its legal status. Lacking a proper normative

characterization,the doctrine is to be understood more as a matter
of policy than as a matter of law. As a result, its ideal systematic
placement would be under the umbrella of transnationalpublic

policy. Transnational public policy establishes universal
principles to serve the common interests of mankind. The key
point, then, is to ascertainwhether and to what extent the values
enshrined into the odious debt doctrine may belong to the realm
of the transnationalpublic policy. In this context, the controversy

on the validity of the Mozambican debt can become the touchstone
for testing the legal status and operation of the odious debt
doctrine.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In June 2019, the Constitutional Council of Mozambique declared
a financial transaction made in contravention of constitutional norms

related to the national budget invalid.' The transaction concerned a
loan of $850 million contracted by Ematum, a Mozambican state-

owned fishing company, with Credit Suisse and guaranteed by the
Mozambican government.
The judgment of the Mozambican Constitutional Council was just

the tip of the iceberg of a complicated financial scheme articulated in
three separate transactions to state-owned enterprises arranged by
2
two banks: the Russian VTB Capital PLC and the Swiss Credit Suisse.

In addition to the Ematum loan, there were two other loans to stateowned enterprises: a $622 million loan to ProIndicus to perform coastal
surveillance (from Credit Suisse) and a $535 million loan to the

Repdblica de Mogambique Conselho Constitucional [Republic of Mozambique
1.
0
Constitutional Council], June 3, 2019, Ac6rdao n 5/CC/2019 (Mozam.) [hereinafter
Constitutional Council Judgment].

Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal, Why Does Mozambique Need to Pay Its Non2.
Odious
Debt?,
FIN.
TIMES
ALPHAvILLE
(April
13,
2019),
https://ftalphaville.ft.com/2019/04/04/1554350405000/Why-does-Mozambique-need-topay-its-non-odious-debt-/ [https://perma.cc/SA6H-E3M2] (arch-ived Sept. 21, 2020).
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company (MAM) to build and

maintain shipyards (from VTB).3 All these loans were backed by
guarantees from the Mozambican government. Of the three loans, only

the one made to Ematum was publicly disclosed and subsequently
converted into loan participation notes (LPNs). These LPNs were, in
turn, legally extinguished in April 2016 through an exchange for $727
4
million of eurobonds issued by the Mozambican government.
Following the disclosure by the Mozambican government of the
existence of these debts, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and
bilateral donors suspended their financial support to Mozambique. As
a result, the local currency depreciated by about 65 percent within six
months and economic growth plummeted to 3.8 percent in 2016 from
6.6 percent the previous year. 5 In this context, the Mozambican
government announced its intention to restructure all its external
commercial debt.6 Since then, no payment on this debt has been made,
causing the country's credit profile to be downgraded and the cost of
financing to rise.7
Making matters even more complicated, in 2016 and in 2017 the
country's administrative court (TribunalAdministrativo) declared the
state guarantees of the Ematum, ProIndicus, and MAM loans illegal
for violating the Constitution and budgetary laws. 8 A special
commission within Parliament arrived at a similar conclusion, and an
independent audit report was subsequently published highlighting
9
numerous irregularities in borrowing and using funds. In December

See id.; see also ALED WILLIAMS, THE MOZAMBIQUE HIDDEN LOANS CASE: AN
3.
OPPORTUNITY FOR DONORS TO DEMONSTRATE ANTI-CORRUPTION COMMITMENT 1 (2018)
(citing tuna fishing and maritime security as supposed reason for loans).
4.
See Olivares-Caminal, supranote 2.
5.
See id.; see also Press Release, IMF, IMF Executive Board Concludes 2017
Article IV Consultation with the Republic of Mozambique, Press Release No. 18/77 (Mar.
7, 2018), https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2018/03/07/pr1877-imf-executive-boardconcludes-2017-article-iv-consultation-with-the-republic-of-mozambique
[https://perma.cc/R2AC-FULM] (archived Aug. 28, 2020).
The government emphasized that "while the external commercial debt
6.
represented only 13 per cent of total external debt, it accounted for over 40 per cent of

debt service," Olivares-Caminal, supra note 2.
Id.
7.
8.
Mogambique PodeAgora Recusar Pagara Divida Oculta, Dizem os Analistas,
e Ganhariacom Isso, CIP 2 (2019), https://cipmoz.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/CIPMozambique-can-now-refuse.pdf [https://perma.cc/V4A2-AEHT] (archived Sept. 14,
2020).
See ASSEMBLEIA DA REPUBLICA VIII LEGISLATURA, RELAT6RIO DA COMISSAO
9.
PARLAMENTAR DE INQUtRITO PARA AVERIGUAR A SITUAQAO DA DMDA PUBLICA 36-7

https://reflekt.ch/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/2016_Bericht30,
2016),
(Nov.
Parlamentarische-Untersuchungskommission-Mogambique-port.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YHU4-SKWH] (archived Nov. 20, 2020); see also KROLL ASSOcS. U.K.
LTD., INDEPENDENT AUDIT RELATED TO LOANS CONTRACTED BY PROINDICUS S.A.,
EMATUM S.A. AND MOZAMBIQUE ASSET MANAGEMENT S.A.
https://www.open.ac.uk/technology/mozambique/sites/www.open.ac.

(June 23,

2017),
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2018, several charges for indictment were brought before the District
Court for the Eastern District of New York against multiple
individuals, including a former Mozambican minister, for having

allegedly conspired to defraud investors through numerous material
misrepresentations and omissions. 10 Further, Mozambique brought a
lawsuit against Credit Suisse and VTB in the English High Court
alleging the invalidity of the secret loans.11
The judgment rendered by the Constitutional Council in June
2019 must be seen in this framework. It was based on a claim filed by
the Budget Monitoring Forum, the Platform of Civil Society

Organizations, and another two thousand citizens to declare the
Ematum transaction unconstitutional. This request was based on
Article 179(2)(p) of the Mozambican Constitution, 12 under which

Parliament has the exclusive competence to authorize the contraction
of loans and other financial transactions and fix the upper limits of

state guarantees. The Ematum transaction, instead, was arranged by
the government and merely approved by the Mozambican Parliament

by means of an ex post resolution.
The Mozambican Parliament opposed the claim of the applicants,
arguing that the resolution was a political act and, thereby, was not
justiciable before

the Constitutional Council. The Constitutional

Council, however, rejected this argument emphasizing that the
government had acted in violation of the constitutional competence of
Parliament in budgetary matters (Article 179) and had not inscribed

the transaction in the state budget in violation of Law Number
9/2002.13 In this way, the Constitutional Council put the violation not

so much on the side of Parliament, but rather on the side of the
government. On these bases, the Constitutional Council declared null
the assumption of the loans and the provision of the guarantees,
relying not only on constitutional norms, but also on some articles of

2

uk.technology.mozambique/files/files/2017-06-23_Project%20Montague%20% 0In
dependent%20Audit%20Executive%2OSummary%2OEnglish%20(REDACTED%20FOR
%20PUBLISHING).pdf [https://perma.cc/CC5X-29CS] (archived Aug. 28, 2020).
10.
Indictment, United States v. Boustani, 356 F. Supp. 3d 246 (E.D.N.Y. 2019)
(No. CR 18 681). For a comment, see Press Release, U.S. Attorney's Office E. Dist. N.Y.,
Three Former Mozambican Government Officials and Five Business Executives Indicted
in Alleged $2 Billion Fraud and Money Laundering Scheme That Victimized U.S.
Investors, DEP'T JUST. (Mar. 7, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/usao-edny/pr/threeformer-mozambican-government-officials-and-five-business-executives-indicted [https://
perma.cc/SVK6-DFL8] (archived Aug. 28, 2020).
Mozambique Sues in UK to Cancel Debt in Secret Loan Case, JUBILEE DEBT
11.
CAMPAIGN (Jan. 20, 2020), https://jubileedebt.org.uk/press-release/mozambique-sues-in(archived
[https://perma.cc/Z2G3-K6H9]
uk-court-to-cancel-debt-in-secret-loan-case
Aug. 28, 2020).
12.

CONST. OF THE REPUBLIC OF MoZAMBIQUE Nov. 16, 2004.

In this respect, the Government also violated the ordinary laws that discipline
13.
the inscription of expenditures in the budgetary law. Constitutional Council Judgment,
supra note 1, at 17.
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the C6digo Civil.14 To complete the picture, in May 2020 the same
Constitutional Council declared the nullity of the MAM and ProIndicus

loans and the related guarantees.1 5 The impact of these declarations of
nullity by the Constitutional Council on the financial transactions is
still to be appreciated in full.
Against this background, the purpose of this work is to ascertain
whether and to what an extent the much invoked, but scarcely applied,
odious debt doctrine may play a role in the lawsuits related to the
Mozambican loan transactions. Part I analyzes the national norms
coming into play before domestic courts, with particular reference to

two issues: the effects on the loan and guarantee agreements of the
declarations of invalidity rendered by the Mozambican Constitutional
Council; and the availability of the restitutionary remedies in relation
to the enforceability of contracts tainted with corruption. As the
application of national laws may result in piecemeal decisions, a
solution can be to have recourse to a uniform benchmark like the
odious debt doctrine. Part II effectuates a reconstruction of the odious
debt doctrine to understand what legal status it possesses and
concludes that it would be reasonable to qualify the doctrine under
transnational public policy. Part III explores the notion of
transnational public policy and its applicability in relation to

international contracts before domestic fora. In this context, the
Mozambican transactions may become a benchmark to test the scope
of the odious debt doctrine beyond the traditional arena of state
succession.
II. LEGAL PROBLEMS
The three Mozambican financial transactions present certain
specificities. The ProIndicus and MAM loans were arranged under a

cloak of secrecy as their proceeds were used to acquire military
equipment for the security services and the Ministry of Defense. By
contrast, contracting the Ematum financing was not hidden: the
existence of the Ematum LPNs was discussed in various IMF country
reports, had been included in the country's public debt statistics, and
these notes were publicly traded and included in JPMorgan's emerging
market bond index.' 6 When the LPNs were extinguished and replaced
with sovereign eurobonds, they were fully disclosed and approved by

14.

The Constitutional Council made reference to the combined provisions of

Articles 294 (nullity of transactions infringing mandatory rules of law), 286 (nullity
demanded at any time by the interested party and declared ex officio by the seized court),
and 289 (retroactive effect of nullity and retrogression of what has been given). Id. at
17-18.
Republica de Mogambique Conselho Constitucional [Republic of Mozambique
15.
Constitutional Council], May 8, 2020, Ac6rdao n" 7/CC/2020 (Mozam.).
16. Olivares-Caminal, supra note 2.
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the Mozambican Parliament. Nevertheless, for various reasons, all
these loans and guarantees may be challenged in court.
A. The Internal Validity of the Transactions
Both the judgments of the Mozambican Constitutional Council
and the decision of the Mozambican administrative court cast doubt on

the authority of the Mozambican government to provide guarantees.
Broadly speaking, the question of the capacity of a government to enter
into financial transactions does not depend on the law governing the
transaction, but on the internal law of the state. In the last century,
the act of borrowing was viewed as an expression of sovereignty on the
17
same footing as the printing of currency. Currently, Parliamentary

authorization has lost its sovereign characterization and can be
considered a step in the borrowing process. 18 The capacity of a

government to bind the state must be appreciated in two regards: the
authority of the government to enter into a financial transaction and
the formal requirement to do so. 19

Under the financial practice, when the borrower or the guarantor
is a sovereign state or a state-controlled entity, the loan or guarantee
agreement is completed by a condition precedent under which the
transaction cannot become operative until the government has

provided documentary evidence that the transaction is valid and
enforceable and that it has the power and the authority to enter into
the agreement. 20 Generally, the declaration on the validity of the
transaction is encapsulated in the representations and warranties
made by the borrower. 21 Its inclusion in the conditions precedent also
emphasizes that the transaction cannot be carried out until the
borrower gives evidence of what it has represented and warranted.
Normally, the documentation of the borrower is completed by a legal

17.
Luis M. Drago, State Loans in Their Relation with InternationalPolicy, 1 AM.
J. INT'L L. 692, 695-696 (1907). The internal invalidity of the loan transactions was often
used as a means to repudiate the loans. This is what occurred in the second half of the
nineteenth century in relation to the debt contracted by certain US southern states; in
particular, North Carolina and South Carolina. In both cases, the debts were incurred
in plain violation of the state constitution and were later repudiated. REGINALD C.
McGRANE, FOREIGN BONDHOLDERS AND AMERICAN STATE DEBTS 334-54 (1935).

18.

Georges van Hecke, Problimes Juridiques des Emprunts Internationaux,

XVIII BIBLIOTHECA VISSERIANA 1, 20 (1964).

19. Charles Cheney Hyde, The Negotiation of External Loans with Foreign
Governments, 16 AM. J. INT'L L. 523, 525-26 (1922).
20.
21.

(1991).

ANDREW McKNIGHT, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 112 (2008).
RAvI C. TENNEKOON, THE LAW & REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 71

20201

MOZAMBICAN ILLEGAL LOANS

1643

opinion made by a lawyer belonging to the jurisdiction of the borrower
that the transaction at hand is valid and binding.2 2
This practice is now reinforced by the United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Principles on Promoting
Responsible Sovereign Lending and Borrowing. 23 Pursuant to
Principle Number 3, lenders have a specific responsibility to determine
whether the financial transaction has been duly authorized and is valid
and enforceable under the relevant jurisdictions. If these conditions
are not met, the lenders should refrain from concluding the agreement.
However, the rule that loans to public borrowers are always invalid
unless properly authorized does not amount to a general principle of
law. At most, it may be qualified as an emerging principle that reflects
a good and reasonable practice. By contrast, it is an accepted general
principle of law that, for a contract to be valid, the borrower needs to

have at least prima facie authority, while the lender must not behave
in bad faith in this respect. 24
1. Ostensible Authority
The ostensible authority of the agent to bind his principal must be
appreciated in the light of the law applicable to the contract that, in

the case of the Mozambican guarantees, corresponds to English law.25

Under English law, the doctrine of apparent authority stipulates that
when a "person by words or conduct represents to a third party that

22.
G.A. PENN, A.M. SHEA & A. ARoRA, 2 BANKING LAW: THE LAW AND PRACTICE
OF INTERNATIONAL BANKING 101-03 (1987).

23.
U.N. Conference on Trade & Development, Principles on Promoting
Responsible
Sovereign
Lending
and
Borrowing
6
(Jan.
10,
2012),
https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/gdsddf2012misc 1en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZP9W-XLM6] (archived Dec. 19, 2020) [hereinafter UNCTAD,
Principleson Promoting]. The Principles constitute the outcome of the UNCTAD Project
on Promoting Responsible Sovereign Lending and Borrowing. See id. at 3-4.
24.
Matthias Goldmann, Responsible Sovereign Lending and Borrowing: The
View
from
Domestic
Jurisdictions
18-19
(Feb.
2012),
[https://
https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/gdsddf2012misc3 en.pdf
perma.cc/H4XW-EVSU] (archived Sept. 21, 2020).
25.

ASSEMBLEIA DA REPUBLICA VIII LEGISLATURA, supra note 9, at 36-37. The

matter does not fall within the purview of the Rome I Regulation that excludes from its
scope the "question whether an agent is able to bind a principal, or an organ to bind a
company or body corporate or incorporate, to a third party" (art. 1(2)(g)), with the result
that the criterion to determine the applicable law is left to common law. Regulation of
the European Parliament and of the Council Regulation (EC) 593/2008 of 7 June 2008
on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (Rome 1), 2008 O.J. (L 177) 6
[hereinafter Rome I Regulation]. In regard to this, common law establishes that the issue
whether an agent is able to bind the principal to contract with a third party is governed
by the law applicable to the contract. See DICEY, MORRIS & COLLINS, 2 THE CONFLICT OF
LAwS 2122 et seq. (Lord Collins of Mapesbury ed., 14th ed. 2012).
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another has authority to act on his behalf, he may be bound by the acts
of that other as if he had in fact authorised them."26
The doctrine of ostensible authority was applied by the Queen's
Bench in a case concerning the failure to pay certain Ukraine bonds
held by Russia.2 7 One of the arguments raised by Ukraine to justify the
default was that the Minister of Finance, who signed the loan

agreement, lacked the proper authorization to do so. 28 On the one
hand, the loan agreement disregarded the budgetary limits contained

in the annual budget law that could be amended only in force of an act
of Parliament. On the other hand, the Council of Ministers did not

follow all of the procedural rules for borrowing. All in all, this has
brought the capacity of Ukraine to enter into a valid loan agreement
with Russia into question. The Queen's Bench dismissed this defense
giving a different view of the capacity to borrow and ostensible
authority. In terms of the capacity of Ukraine to borrow, the court
espoused the argument that was laid down by the trustee of the bonded
29
loan, under which restrictions on state activity cannot be presumed.

In doing so, the court did not pay much attention to the fact that the
trustee was referring to the Lotus case (Francev. Turkey) that dealt
with an interstate dispute, while in the case at hand the dispute was

with the trustee.3 0 In terms of the ostensible authority to sign the
contract by the Ukraine government, the court held that the issue was
to be assessed under English law that was the law governing the
transaction. In this context, the court emphasized that the transaction
documents clearly recorded that Ukraine was represented by the
Minister of Finance acting upon the instructions of the Cabinet of

26.
Francis M.B. Reynolds, Agency, in 2 CHITIY ON CONTRAcTS 1, 35-36 (Hugo
G. Beale ed., 31st ed. 2012).
27.
Following the deflagration of the USSR, Ukraine adopted a policy of close
relations with the EU that culminated in a proposal to enter into an Association
Agreement with the EU (2013). Russia vigorously opposed this possibility and in the end
the Ukraine government was obliged to renounce to the EU agreement. In exchange for
that renunciation, Russia granted financial support to Ukraine in the form of $15 billion.
The first tranche of the loan consisted of $3 billion, secured by Ukrainian bonds issued
under a trust deed governed by English law. Following the Russian annexation of Crimea
and the intestine war, the Ukraine government decided to stop servicing the bonds. In
the face of a default, the trustee-instructed by Russia-applied to the English High
Court for a summary judgement in relation to the payment on the bonds. Law Debenture
Tr. Corp. v. Ukraine [2017] EWHC 655 (QB), [2017] 1 CLC 298, [298], [304]-[06], [341][46] (Eng.).
28. Id. at [330].
29.
Id. at [336].
30.
The trustee referred to RUSTEL SILVESTRE J. MARTHA, THE FINANcIAL
OBLIGATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 203 (2015), which considers the tenet enunciated in

the Lotus Case applicable to the field of international financial law, under which the
rules of law binding upon states derive from their own free will as expressed in
conventions or by usages generally accepted as reflecting principles of law and
restrictions cannot be presumed. Id. at [328-31]; see S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), Judgement,
1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18 (Sept. 7).
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Ministers. Moreover, there were previous instances of signature by the
Minister of Finance of bond issuances under the same trust. Hence, the
ostensible authority of the Minister of Finance to sign this type of
3
document was plainly established. 1
The ruling of the Queen's Bench constitutes a precedent in
relation to the validity of the Mozambican guarantees, especially since

English courts are the competent forum and English law is the
applicable law. Also, in this case, the key point is the ostensible or
usual authority by the government to sign financial agreements in the
name of and on behalf of the Mozambican state. This point is to be
appreciated in the light of the criteria laid down in the decision

mentioned above. In this case, the Minister of Finance signed the
documents upon instructions of the government and the signature
regarded all the guarantee agreements. Moreover, the Ematum
transaction was endorsed by a resolution of the Mozambican
Parliament. The elements of an ostensible authority may be found.
2. Overriding Mandatory Rules

The doctrine of ostensible authority generally preserves the whole
transaction from being affected by the internal invalidity of the loan.

Nevertheless, the issue of the internal validity might still come into
play in the form of an overriding mandatory rule of Mozambique.
Under Article 9(1) of the Rome I Regulation, 32 overriding
mandatory rules are those provisions, the respect for which is regarded
as crucial by a country for safeguarding its public interests, such as its

political, social, or economic organization, to be applied irrespective of
the law applicable to the contract. 33 This notion must be appreciated

in three respects. First, not all of the mandatory provisions of a foreign
state can qualify themselves as overriding mandatory provisions and

prevail over the mandatory rules of the forum. 34 Second, respect for
these provisions must be crucial to preserve a public interest that
involves the political, economic, and social organization of a country.

31.
Law Debenture Tr. Corp. [2017] 1 CLC at [336]-[37].
Rome I Regulation, supra note 25.
32.
This notion reflects the judgment rendered by the European Court of Justice
33.
in Arblade under which "[t]he fact that national rules are categorised as public-order
legislation does not mean that they are exempt from compliance with the provisions of
the Treaty. ... The considerations underlying such national legislation can be taken into
account by Community law only in terms of the exceptions to Community freedoms

&

expressly provided for by the Treaty and, where appropriate, on the ground that they
constitute overriding reasons relating to the public interest." Joined Cases C-369/96
C-376/96, Criminal Proceedings Against Jean-Claude Arblade, 1999 E.C.R. I-8453, 1 31.
Overriding mandatory rules of the applicable law take precedence over the
34.
mandatory rules of the forum. See Andrea Bonomi, Art. 9: Overriding Mandatory
Provisions, in 2 EUROPEAN COMMENTARIES ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: ROME I
REGULATION - COMMENTARY 599, 620 (Ulrich Magnus & Peter Mankowski eds., 2017).
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Antitrust regulations, embargoes and economic sanctions, regulations
of the stock exchange, and exchange controls fall into this category.35
Third, these provisions must have an overriding effect, which means

they are to be applied regardless of the normal rules on conflict-of-laws.
Under the Rome I Regulation, overriding mandatory rules of a
third country may come into play indirectly on the basis of the lex fori
and directly as part of the law of the third country.3 6 With reference to
the lex fori, the overriding mandatory rules of a third country would

come into play not so much per se, but under the public policy of the
forum (Article 9(2)).37 With reference to the law of a third country, the
application of overriding mandatory rules is subjected to many
conditions (Article 9(3)). First of all, the overriding mandatory

provisions can be applied only if they render the performance of the
contract unlawful. Second, the mandatory provisions must belong to
the country where the obligations arising out of the contract have to be

or have been performed. However, even though these conditions are
met, the seized court enjoys a wide range of discretion in deciding
whether or not to apply the overriding mandatory rules in question. In

this process, the seized court is called to consider the nature and
purpose of the overriding mandatory provisions and the consequences

of their application or nonapplication. 38 This assessment involves
striking a balance between all the interests at stake: those of the
parties, those of the forum, those of the state of the overriding
mandatory rules, and those of the state of the law governing the
39

contract.

Against this background, the Mozambican constitutional norms
on the internal invalidity of the loan can be easily categorized as
overriding mandatory rules, as they partake of the political, social, and
economic order of the state. These constitutional norms can come into
play indirectly under the lex fori to the extent that it prohibits the

enforcement of contracts that involve the performance of an illegal act
pursuant to the laws of a friendly foreign state. It is up to the English

Id. at 621.
35.
On this distinction see Adeline Chong, The Public Policy and Mandatory
36.
Rules of Third Countries in InternationalContracts, 2 J. PRIV. INT'L L. 27, 40-47 (2006).
In Regazzoni v. K.C. Sethia [1958] A.C. 301 (HL), the foreign mandatory rule
37.
was not applied per se, but because it was against English public policy to enforce
contracts that involved the performance of an illegal act according to the laws of a
friendly foreign state. See Chong, supra note 36, at 41-42 (discussing Regazzoni v. K.C.
Sethia).
38.
Jonathan Harris, Mandatory Rules and Public Policy Under the Rome I
Regulation, in

ROME I

REGULATION:

THE

LAW APPLICABLE

TO

CONTRACTUAL

OBLIGATIONS IN EUROPE 269, 325-30 (Franco Ferrari & Stefan Leible eds., 2009).
This is a sort of comity doctrine assessment. To the extent that the interests
39.
of the state of the overriding mandatory rules are deemed to prevail, the foreign act is
enforced provided that this is consistent with the laws and policies of the forum. See Joel
R. Paul, Comity in InternationalLaw, 32 HARV. INT'L L. J. 1, 43-44 (1991).
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judge to operate such an appreciation that would displace the rules on
ostensible authority. These constitutional norms can also come into
play directly under the law of a third country, provided that a series of
conditions are met. The first condition is that these norms must belong
to the state where the contractual obligations are to be performed and
are capable of making the performance unlawful. In the present case,
the loan transactions have been performed in Mozambique and are
illegal under the law of Mozambique, as emphasized by the
Mozambican Constitutional Council. The second condition is that the
seized forum is required to make an evaluation of all the interests at
stake, in particular of the consequences of the application of the
Mozambican overriding mandatory rules. In this regard, however, the

English judge might conclude that the necessity of preserving the
binding nature of the loan contracts and the orderly functioning of
financial markets for sovereign debt constitute prevailing interests of
the forum. 40
3. Novation
Even though Mozambican constitutional norms should apply, and
the invalidity would affect the performance of the transactions, it is
questionable whether and to what extent this invalidity would affect

the bonded loan issued by the Mozambican government. This is
particularly true with reference to Ematum, because the Ematum loan
underwent a restructuring process. 41 From a substantive standpoint,
a restructuring operation consists of a debt conversion under which the
old debt is exchanged for bonds of minor nominal value issued by the

same debtor. The forerunner of these restructuring operations was the
auction organized by Mexico in 1988, at which holders of syndicated
debts tendered their credits in exchange for Mexican bonds secured by
twenty-year zero-coupon US Treasury bonds held in escrow at the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York. 42 From a formal standpoint, this
operation amounts to an objective novation. Novation is a civilian
institute that permits the extinction of the original obligation and its
replacement with another between the same or new parties (or some of
them).4 3 In this context, the bonds issued under the restructuring of
the Ematum loan amount to a completely new obligation with different
terms and conditions and a new debtor (here, the Republic of

Such an outcome would be consistent with the fact that London is one of the
40.
major financial centers.
41.
See supra Part I.
Michael Chamberlin, Michael Gruson & Paul Weltchek, Sovereign Debt
42.
Exchanges, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 415, 450-51.
Andrew S. Burrows, Assignment, in 1 CHITTY ON CONTRACTS 1495, 1515-16
43.
(Hugo G. Beale ed., 31st ed. 2012).
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Mozambique). 44 Hence, the Mozambican bonded loan should not be
affected by the invalidity of the Ematum loan transaction that has been
wholly extinguished. 45 Nevertheless, a recent amendment to the
French Civil Code may question this assumption. New Article 1331 of
the French Civil Code provides that, if the obligations are not valid,

their novation does not produce any effect. 46 In this connection, it is
worth considering that the ways of extinguishing the obligations are
47
in this case
governed by the law governing the original contract,
English law. Although French law is not the governing law, it may

nonetheless constitute a benchmark for a common law judge to
understand a civilian notion like novation.

B. Corruptionand Enforceability of Contracts
There

transactions

is

a

were

strong

claim

tainted,

that

though

the

at

Mozambican

different

financial

degrees,

with

corruption. 4 8 It is certainly true that globalization, including financial
49
This is
globalization, is often combined with transnational bribery.

a harmful phenomenon that produces economic, systemic, and social
damages 50 and is capable of threatening the rule of law, property
rights, and the enforcement of contracts, and of contributing to
undermining the legitimacy of a tainted government. 51 Since it is a
transnational phenomenon touching on economic connecting points,

corruption has progressively become the object of international
conventions, the most far-reaching of which is the (2003) UN

44.

Olivares-Caminal, supra note 2.

45.

See id. But see JEFF KING, THE DOCTRINE OF ODIOUS DEBT IN INTERNATIONAL

&

LAW 188 (2016).
New Art. 1331 of the French Civil Code was introduced by Ordonnance No
46.
131-2016. CODE CIvIL [C. cIv.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 1331 (Fr.). In this way, French law has
acknowledged the old rule "ce qui est nul ne peut etre susceptibled'aucun effet" laid down
by Robert Joseph Pothier in his Traitds des Obligations, in 1 OEUVRES DE POTHIER, sect.
589 (ed. 1824).
47. See Rome I Regulation supranote 25, Art. 12(1)(d); see also DICEY, MORRIS
COLLINS, supra note 25, at 1860.
48.
Cf. supraPart I (discussing the irregularities and covert nature of some of the
loans).
49.
According to the World Economic forum statistics, the global cost of
corruption is at least $2.6 trillion, or 5 percent of the global gross domestic
product (GDP), and, according to the World Bank, businesses and individuals pay more
than $1 trillion in bribes every year. See Press Release, Security Council, Global Cost of
Corruption at Least 5 Per Cent of World Gross Domestic Product, Secretary-General
Tells Security Council, Citing World Economic Forum Data, U.N. Press Release
SC/13493 (Sep. 10, 2018).
50.
See Philip M. Nichols, Regulating Transnational Bribery in Times of
Globalisationsand Fragmentation,24 YALE J. INT'L L. 257, 270-279 (1999).
51.
See Christiana Ochoa, From Odious Debt to Odious Finance: Avoiding the
Externalitiesof a Functional Odious Debt Doctrine, 49 HARV. J. INT'L L. 109, 144 (2008).
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Convention Against Corruption.5 2 Article 16 of the UN Convention
imposes the criminalization of active bribery by foreign public officials
and invites the signatory states to criminalize the passive bribery of

these public officials.

The UN

Convention,

in addressing the

consequences of an act of corruption, enables the signatory states to
consider corruption a relevant factor in legal proceedings to annul or
rescind contracts, withdraw a concession or other similar instrument,
or take any other remedial action (Article 34).53 This option implies
that the enforceability of a contract tainted with corruption is still

mainly left to the norms of the domestic legal orders.
Under the English doctrine of illegality and public policy, "no court
will lend its aid to a man who founds his cause of action upon an
immoral or illegal act."5 4 This doctrine is essentially a procedural rule
that precludes the enforcement of a contract and the provision of other
remedies. 55 Broadly speaking, a contract is illegal when it contravenes
the law in terms of formation and performance. 56 Illegality may

concern not only the contract to which it is directly related, but also
collateral transactions connected to this contract. 57 Against this
background, if an upstream corruptive activity could be proved, the
58
downstream Mozambican financial transactions would follow its fate.
1. Restitutionary Remedies
Even though the doctrine of illegality would bar the enforceability
of a contract, it could still be possible to recover money under the law
of restitution that is meant to reverse unjust enrichment. The core of

this branch of law consists of the fact that no one can be enriched at

52.
53.

G.A. Res. 58/4 (Oct. 31, 2003).
Juan Bautista Justo, UNCTAD's Principles on Public Debt and the United

Nations Convention against Corruption: Links and Common Strategies, in SOVEREIGN
FINANCING AND INTERNATIONAL LAw, 189, 206-07 (Carlos Esposito, Yeufen Li, Juan

Pablo Bohoslavsky eds., 2013).
54. The courts follow this route "not for the sake of the defendant, but because
they will not lend their aid to such a plaintiff"; moreover, "where both are equally in
fault, potior est condicio defendentis," Holman v. Johnson [1775] 1 Cowp. 341, 343 (Lord
Mansfield) (Eng.).
55.
See Dan D. Prentice, Illegality and Public Policy, in 1 CHITTY ON CONTRAcTS
1223, 1228 (Hugo G. Beale ed., 31st ed. 2012). The rule goes back to Evert v. Williams
(1725) where the Court of Exchequer refused to enforce a contract meant to share the
profits of armed robbery between two highwaymen. The text of the judgment is lost, but
it is possible to read an account in the Law Quarterly Review. See 9 L. Q. REV. 197 (1893).
56.
See Prentice, supra note 55, at 1229-30.
57.
See id. at 1325-26; A discussion of connected transactions can be found in
Nayyar v. Denton Wilde Sapte. See [2009] EWHC 3218 (QB) (Eng.).
58.
It is also a general principle of law that contracts resulting from acts of
corruption are void. See Goldmann, supra note 24, at 34.

1650

VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL. 53:1637

the expense of another without a justification. 9 In civil law systems,
unjustified enrichment is usually categorized as a quasi ex contractu
obligation, while in common law systems it is the basis of the law of
restitution. 6 0

However, restitution cannot be granted if doing so would have the
same effect as enforcing unenforceable contracts. 61 In these cases, no
court will give assistance to either party for restitution. This implies

that the illegality of a contract may operate not only to bar the
enforcement of that contract, but also to disqualify the claimant's right
to restitution of the benefits transferred under the contract.6 2
With regard to this, the UK Supreme Court in Patel v. Mirza laid

down some criteria that should guide the judge in deciding whether
and to what extent the public interest would be harmed in enforcing a

claim to recover money under an illegal agreement. 63 The case
concerned the provision of money to trade in shares under an insider

dealing scheme. The illegal activity did not take place, and the plaintiff
brought a lawsuit to have his money back based, inter alia, on unjust
enrichment. Lord Toulson, delivering the opinion with which the
majority agreed, highlighted that illegality may provide a defense to

civil claims of every sort. In civil claims, there are two discernible
policies underlying the doctrine of illegality: first, a person should not

be allowed to profit from his wrongdoing; second, the law should be
coherent and not self-defeating, "condoning illegality by giving with the
left hand what it takes with the right hand." 64 As a matter of principle,

a person should not be debarred from recovering what was transferred
under an unlawful consideration, unless some public interest is
seriously harmed. In this context, three criteria may come into
consideration. First, it is necessary to consider the underlying purpose
of the provision that has been infringed and whether this purpose can

be reinforced by the denial of the claim; second, it is necessary to
consider other public policies on which the denial of the claim may have

According to Lord Mansfield "the defendant, upon the circumstances of the
59.
case, is obliged by the ties of natural justice and equity to refund the money." Moses v.
Macferlan (1760) 2 Burr 1005, 1012 (Eng.). In other words, the defendant has been
enriched, this enrichment occurred at the expense of the plaintiff, and it is unjust to
permit him to retain this benefit. See ROBERT GOFF & GARETH JONES, THE LAW OF

RESTITUTION 14-16 (1st ed. 1966).
See Paolo Gallo, Unjust Enrichment:A ComparativeAnalysis, 40 AM. J. COMP.
60.
L. 431, 436 (1992); Daniel P. O'Connell, Unjust Enrichment, 5 AM. J. COMP. L. 2, 2-3, 14
(1956).
61.

See RICHARD A. BUCKLEY, ILLEGALITY AND PUBLIC POLICY 265 (2nd ed. 2009).

62.

See William J. Swalding, The Role of Illegality in the English Law of

Enrichment, in UNJUSTIFIED ENRICHMENT: KEY ISSUES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES

289, 298 (David Johnston & Reinhard Zimmerman eds., 2002).
See Patel v. Mirza [2016] UKSC 42 [120] (appeal taken from EWCA (Civ)); see
63.
also Andrew Burrows, Illegality after Patel v. Mirza, 70 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 55, 59
(2017).

64.

Patel, [2016] UKSC 42 at [99].

20201

MOZAMBICAN ILLEGAL LOANS

1651

an impact; and, third, it is necessary to consider whether the denial of
the claim would be a proportionate sanction, considering that
punishment is a matter for the criminal court. 65 Although the effective
acknowledgment of these criteria in lower courts is still uncertain, 6 6
Lord Toulson warned that there may be rare cases where the
enforcement of claims based on unjust enrichment might be considered
as "undermining the integrity of the justice system." 67
The issue of proportionality has been also acknowledged in the US

legal system, where the Restatement 2d of Contracts stipulates that a
party has no claim in restitution for the performance he has made
under or in return of a promise that is unenforceable for public policy,
unless this would involve a disproportionate forfeiture. 68 The
disproportion of the forfeiture must be appreciated in the light of the
public interest involved and the extent of the contravention: "if the
claimant has threatened grave social harm, no forfeiture will be
69
disproportionate."

Once corruption is proved in relation to the Mozambican
transactions, the availability of a restitutionary remedy must be tested
in the light of the three criteria laid down in Patel v. Mizra. In terms
of underlying purpose of the infringed prohibition, the aim is to ensure
market integrity and fair competition among lenders. In terms of

additional public policy, the denial of the claim would lead lenders to
reinforce internal mechanisms of audit and compliance. In terms of
proportionate response, the issue will be evaluated in light of the
consequences of the fraudulent activity. Nevertheless, even though
these three criteria should be cumulatively satisfied, the final warning

of Lord Toulson to bar the defense only in "rare cases" could tip the
scales in favor of granting the remedy.

65.
See id. at [120].
66.
See Matthias Goldmann, The Law and PoliticalEconomy of the Mozambique's
Odious Debt, in HoW TO AVOID THE REPETITION OF "ODIOUS" DEBTS? 6 (2019).
67.
Patel, [2016] UKSC 42 at [121] (Toulson, LJ). However, the granting of the
restitutionary remedies cannot amount to a stultification of the law. See GOFF & JONES:

THE LAW OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT 897-900 (Charles Mitchell, Paul Mitchell & Stephen
Watterson eds., 9th ed. 2016).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 197 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). Sections
68.
198 and 199 provide some temperaments to this rule when a party has not engaged in
serious misconduct and he has withdrawn from the transaction before the purpose had

been implemented, when allowing the claim would put an end to a continuing situation
in contrast with the public interest, or when a party was excusably ignorant of the facts
or of a legislation of minor importance or he was not equally involved in the promise. See
id. §§ 198-99.
Id. § 197 cmt. b.
69.
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2. Unclean Hands

The Restatement 3d of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment,
reformulating the rules of the Restatement 2d of Contracts, has
stipulated that there is no claim when the allowance of restitution
would defeat the policy of the law that makes the agreement
unenforceable. 70 In this context, two competing policies come into play:
the policy against unjust enrichment and the policy prohibiting the
underlying transaction. If these policies are incompatible, the public

policy against the enforcement of the transaction prevails over the
private

claims based on unjust enrichment.

In these cases, the

restitutionary remedy can also be denied on the basis of the inequitable
conduct of the claimant that is the source of the asserted liability: "he
who comes into equity must come with clean hands." 71
A meaningful application of the defense of "unclean hands" is
given in Adler v. Nigeriawhere the plaintiff became involved in a series
of false transactions in which he should have received some money
under over-invoiced contracts with Nigeria.7 2 Under the fraudulent
scheme, Adler, the plaintiff, provided $5 million to the Nigerian

officials in exchange for transactions worth $60 million. As that
fraudulent scheme broke down, Adler did not receive anything and

sued Nigeria before the federal courts of California to reclaim the sums
given to the Nigerian officials. On appeal, the court rejected the
argument submitted by the plaintiff that denying the remedy would

involve an unjust enrichment to Nigerian officials. The court
underscored that, although the fraudulent scheme was concocted by
Nigerian officials, Adler had freely joined it. In this context, granting

the remedy when the bribe had not reached the hoped-for result would
encourage

individuals like the plaintiff to take part into these

schemes.73

70.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 31 (AM.
LAW INST. 2011).
The defense of the "unclean hands" comes from a maxim elaborated by the
71.
English Barrister Richard Francis in his book MAXIMS OF EQUITY (1728): "he who hath
committed iniquity shall not have equity." RICHARD FRANCIS, MAXIMS OF EQUITY 5
(1728). Later, it was acknowledged by the United States Supreme Court. See generally
Talbot v. Jansen, 3 U.S. 133 (1795). The defense has the purpose of preserving the
integrity of the judicial system that would be undermined by the allowing a claimant
with unclean hands to recover. See T. Leigh Aneson, Announcing the "Clean Hands"
Doctrine, 51 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 1827, 1841 (2018).
72.
See generally Adler v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 219 F.3d 869 (9th Cir.
2000).
In substance, the Federal Court weighted the competing policies of
73.
discouraging frauds like that suffered by Adler and of discouraging individuals like Adler
from participating in such an operation and considered the latter prevailing. See id. at
877.
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In light of the decision rendered in the Adler case, the policy of
discouraging fraudulent operations seems to prevail over the policy of
avoiding unjust enrichment. Once corruption can be proved, the same
rationale could plainly apply to the Mozambican loans with even more
strength: in this case, the fraudulent operation was accomplished.
III. THE ODIOUS DEBT DOCTRINE

The multifaceted question of the validity of the Mozambican
financial transactions will be decided in domestic courts on the basis of
domestic laws. This involves a fragmentation in the outcomes of the
lawsuits. To correct this flaw, at least partially, the solution is to have
recourse to a uniform legal benchmark. In the absence of a proper
international convention on the phenomenon of sovereign debt, this
benchmark might be provided by the so-called "odious debt doctrine."

In this context, the key point is to ascertain the legal status of this
doctrine.
A. The Emergence of the Doctrine

In the 1920s, the Russian "dmigrd" Alexander Sack elaborated a
doctrine under which odious debt constituted an exception to the rule
of the passage of public debt in cases of state succession and of

government succession. To qualify itself as odious, a debt must be
contracted by a despotic regime, not in the interest of the nation, but
as a means to strengthen its power and in the lenders' awareness of all
that ("a su des cr anciers").74

In terms of state succession, the general rule is that local debt (i.e.,
debt contracted by a territorial entity of the state) and localized debt
(i.e., debt contracted by the central government for local projects or
areas) pass to the successor state, while in relation to national debt
(i.e., debt contracted by governments for general purposes) the picture
is more complicated. In the case of absorption or merger, the absorbing

or newly created state shall assume the debt of the extinguished state.
In the case of secession or separation, however, where the predecessor
state continues its existence, the national debt will remain with the
predecessor state, even though the successor state may assume a
portion of the debt on an equitable basis. 75 In the view of Sack, an

74.
See ALEXANDER N. SAcK, LES EFFETS DES TRANSFORMATIONS DES ETATS SUR
LES DETTES PUBLIQUES 157-184 (1927). For a comment on the evolution of this concept,
see ROBERT HOWSE, THE CONcEPT OF ODIOUS DEBT IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 2

(2007), https://unctad.org/en/docs/osgdp20074_en.pdf
(archived Aug 23, 2020).
75.

[https://perma.cc/5VP2-C2YP]

MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 996-98 (6th ed. 2008).
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exception to this rule concerns debts that are odious to the population
or to the successor state.76
With reference to debts odious to the population, a first example
concerns the controversy surrounding the Cuban debt following the
Spanish-American War (1898). Towards the end of the nineteenth

century, the Spanish Crown had contracted bonded debt secured by
certain fiscal revenues of Cuba, the proceeds of which were used to
suppress the struggle for the independence of the island.77 During the
peace negotiations following the defeat of Spain, the US delegation
successfully pleaded the argument of the nonpassage of those debts,
arguing that they

were not

contracted in

of the

the interest

population. 7 8 Although the peace treaty reflected the position of the
United States, the traditional rule of the passage of the debt to the
annexing state was formally maintained through an escamotage, under
which Cuba was not ceded but abandoned by the Spanish Crown.79 By
the same token, the Treaty of Versailles (1919) stipulated that the debt
incurred by Germany and Prussia for the forced colonization of Polish
lands should not have passed to Poland (Article 255).80 For similar
reasons, after the "Anschluss" of Austria (1938), the German Reich
refused to assume the Austrian bonded loans organized by the League
of Nations, as the guarantee agreement that backed those loans
contained a clause concerning the independence of Austria from other
nations that was considered against the interest of the Austrian
people. 81 With reference to debt odious to the successor state, a first

76.

SACK, supra note 74, at 158-71.

77.

See ERNST FEILCHENFELD, PUBLIC DEBT AND STATE SUcCESSION

329-43

(1931).
Although it was aware of the fact that not all the debt had been contracted
78.
for "odious" purposes, see id. at 339-40, the American delegation insisted that "[t]he
decrees of the Spanish government itself show that these debts were incurred in the
fruitless endeavors of government to suppress the aspirations of the Cuban people for
greater liberty and freer government." 1 JOHN BASSETT MOORE, A DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 377 (1906).

79.
The Treaty of Peace between Spain and the United States (signed December
10, 1898) established that Cuba was "relinquished" and not "ceded" to the United States.
See Treaty of Paris art. I, Dec. 10, 1898, Spain-U.S., 187 C.T.S. 101 ("Spain relinquishes
all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba."). This is in contrast to the case of Puerto
Rico, which was explicitly the object of cession (art. II). See SACK, supranote 74, at 14344. In this way, the debt did not pass either to the United States, as the possession of
the island was acquired a non domino, or to Cuba, as it was already occupied by US
troops and so deprived of sovereignty. See FRANTZ DESPAGNET,
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 125 (1910).

COURS

DE DROIT

The Treaty of Peace with Germany was concluded at Versailles on 28 June
80.
1919. See Treaty of Versailles, Jun. 28, 1919, 225 C.T.S. 189; SACK, supra note 74, at
159-60.
Although the financial arrangements were made with the purpose of meeting
81.
the objective necessities of the population, the guarantor states had a clear political
intent. See James L. Foorman & Michael E. Jehle, Effects of State Succession and
Government Succession on CommercialBank Loans to Sovereign Borrowers, 1982 U. ILL.
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example concerns the debts contracted by the Boer Republics to finance
warfare against the United Kingdom (1899-1902). At the time of the
annexation of the defeated Boer Republics, Great Britain declared its
unwillingness to recognize those obligations, arguing that debt
incurred by the enemy could not pass to the victorious power. 82 A
similar approach had already been acknowledged in the Fourteenth
Amendment to the US Constitution, which excludes the debt incurred

by the Confederate States to finance their rebellion (1861-1867) from
the rule of maintenance. 83
In terms of government succession, the general rule is that a
change of government does not affect the obligations contracted by the

previous government. 84 The exception depicted by Sack concerns the
so-called dettes de regime. They are debts contracted by a despotic
regime not for the benefit of the population, but to strengthen its

power. 85 This type of debt may be regarded as a personal debt of the
government, as found by Chief Justice Taft in the Tinoco arbitration, 86

L. REV. 1, 21-22. In force of Art. 88 of the Treaty of Peace between the Allied Powers and
Austria (signed 10 September 1919), the defeated country was deprived of the power to
alienate its independence without the consent of the Council of the League of Nations.
See Treaty of Saint-Germain art. 88, Sep. 10, 1919, 226 C.T.S. 36. This undertaking was
solemnly restated by Austria in connection with the two League Loans: explicitly in
Protocol No. I for Economic and Financial Assistance to Austria and implicitly in the
Austrian Protocol. See Protocol No. I for Economic and Financial Assistance to Austria,
Oct. 4, 1922, XII L.N.T.S. 387; Austrian Protocol, July 15, 1932, CXXXV L.N.T.S. 285.
82.

See JOHN WESTLAKE, INTERNATIONAL LAW, PART I: PEACE 78 (1904) (noting a

traditional understanding that a successor is not liable for loans that a predecessor took
out for the purposes of funding war). In doing so, the UK government was not invoking
a rule of law but rather a rule of expediency. See ARTHUR B. KEITH, THE THEORY OF
STATE SUCCESSION, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO ENGLISH AND COLONIAL LAW 65

(1907). In effect, under the Agreement between Great Britain and the Orange Free State
and the South African Republic as to the Terms of Surrender of the Boer Forces in the
Field (signed May 31, 1902), the notes issued as a war loan would have been regarded as
evidence of war losses of the original holders as long as they were issued for valuable
considerations (art. 10). See Peace of Vereeniging, May 31, 1902, 191 C.T.S. 234. The
official position of His Majesty's government was acknowledged by Lord Alverstone. See
West Rand Gold Mining Co. Ltd. v. The King [1905] 2 KB 391, 401-06.
83.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 4; see Lee C. Buchheit, G. Mitu Gulati & Robert
B. Thompson, The Dilemma of Odious Debts, 56 DUKE L. J. 1201, 1213, n. 29 (2007).
84.
"Public debts, whether due to or from the revolutionised State, are neither
cancelled nor affected by any change in the constitution or internal Government of a
State." HENRY W. HALLECK, HALLECK'S INTERNATIONAL LAw 76 (Sir Sherston Baker ed.,

1878). Following the French Revolution, the Constitution of 1791 established that "[sbous
aucun pretexte, les fonds necessairesd l'aquittementde la dette nationale ... ne pourront
ttre ni refusis ni suspendus." 1791 CONST. tit. V, art. 2 (Fr.).
SACK, supra note 74, at 157, justified this position by arguing that creditors
85.
in this case "ont commis un acte ostile a l'egarddu peuple; ils ne peuvent donc pas compter
que la nation affranchie d'un pouvoir despotique assume le dettes 'odieuses, qui sont des
dettes personelles de ce pouvoir."

"The bank knew that this money was to be used by the retiring president ...
86.
for his personal support after he had taken refuge in a foreign country. It could not hold
his own government for the money paid to him for this purpose." Aguilar-Armory & Royal
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or as a personal debt of a particular class of citizens, as highlighted by
the Soviet institute of international law with particular reference to
the debts incurred by the Czarist regime. 87 In more recent times, the
doctrine was advanced by the People's Republic of China in an aide-

mdmorie, 88 which was submitted in a lawsuit before the Northern
District Court of Alabama regarding the payments on defaulted bonds
issued in 1911 by the Chinese Imperial government. 89

The Jubilee 2000 campaign has led many antidebt activists to
invoke the application of the odious debt doctrine beyond the narrow

boundaries of state succession and government succession. As a further
step, they have systematically put odious debt under the wider
category of illegitimate debt that includes debt against national law,
debt against public policy, and unfair or objectionable debt. 90 The

category of illegitimate debt would cover loans to oppressive regimes
(Argentina and South Africa), loans bearing usurious interest (Latin
American countries), loans for bad projects (Tanzania, Nigeria, and
Indonesia), loans for self-enriching regimes (The Philippines), and

loans to unreliable governments (Zaire). 91 The motivation behind the
creation of the category of illegitimate debt and the subsumption of
odious debt under it is that an odious/illegitimate debt should not be
repaid. 92 Nevertheless, the flaw in this argumentation is that the
odious debt doctrine and the wider illegitimate debt doctrine lack
proper legal underpinnings. 93

Bank of Canada (Gr. Brit. v. Costa Rica), 1 R.I.A.A. 369, 394 (1923); see also infra Part
IV.E.
See Evgeny A. Korovin, Soviet Treatiesand InternationalLaw, 22 AM. J. INT'L
87.
L. 753, 762-63 (1928) (discussing the characterization of the October Revolution as a
radical change of government); Boris Mirkine-Guetzevitch, La Doctrine Sovietique du
Droit International, 32 REVUE GENERAL DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIQUE 313, 320321 (1925). However, most of the Czarist debt was contracted for development purposes.
See HAROLD G. MOULTON & LEO PASVOLSKY, WORLD WAR DEBT SETTLEMENTS 60 (1929).
On the general assumption that "it is a long-established principle of
88.
international law that odious debts are not to be succeeded to," the aide memoire argued
that, in China, a radical change of regime took place and that the railways bearer bonds
constituted a means through which the previous government strengthened its
oppression of the Chinese people. See People's Republic of China, Aide Memoire of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 22 I.L.M. 81 (1983). It concluded that "[t]his position of the
Chinese Government fully conforms to the principles of international law and has a
sound basis in jurisprudence." See id.

89.
The point was dismissed implicitly by the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Alabama on the assumption of the irrelevance of political changes
for the continuity of the states in international law. See Jackson v. People's Republic of
China, 550 F. Supp. 869, 872 (N.D. Ala. 1982).
90.
See Joseph Hanlon, Defining "IllegitimateDebt": When Creditors Should Be
Liable for Improper Loans, in SOVEREIGN DEBT AT THE CROSSROADS 109, 109-11 (Chris
Jochnick & Fraser A. Preston eds., 2006).
91.
See id. at 118-25.
92.
See Christoph G. Paulus, The Evolution of the "Concept of Odious Debt", 68
HEIDELBERG J. INT'L L. 391, 393-94 (2008).
93.
Buchheit, Gulati & Thompson, supra note 83, at 1228-30.
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With reference to the odious debt, currently the odiousness of a
should be appreciated against three criteria, that are a

reformulation of those previously identified by Sack and enfranchise

the doctrine from the arena of state/government succession. These
criteria are the absence of consent by the population, the absence of
benefit for the population, and the awareness of this on the part of the

creditors. 94 In terms of the absence of consent, a democratic
government is presumed to have the consent of the population to
govern a country and thereby also the consent to raise loans. By
contrast, a nondemocratic government is not presumed to have consent
to govern a country and, implicitly, to borrow. Nevertheless, in both

cases this is a rebuttable presumption. On the one hand, a nonelected
government may also enjoy some general consent within the
population and some specific consent in relation to particular loans. On
the other hand, it is questionable that under a democratic government

a loan should reflect the consent of the population only because
constitutional requirements have been satisfied. In this respect, the
formalistic criterion of the validity of the loan is not sufficient: it is
necessary to consider the benefit to the population. 95 In terms of the
absence of benefit, it is necessary to draw a distinction between loans

for general purposes and loans for specific purposes. While the
odiousness can be easily established for loans related to specific
projects, the beneficial impact of loans contracted for general purposes
on the population must be ascertained from time to time. Under a
dictatorial regime, loans for general purposes may be odious as far as
they can serve to reinforce an illegitimate government, while loans for

specific projects that are objectively beneficial for the population are
nevertheless odious because they free funds that can be used for odious
purposes. 9 6 In terms of creditors' awareness, the key point is whether

it is necessary to have an actual knowledge or whether a reckless
ignorance suffices. Both cases presuppose that creditors are burdened
with the responsibility to make inquiry into the purpose of the loans. 97

94.
SABINE MICHALOWSKY, UNCONSTITUTIONAL REGIMES AND THE VALIDITY OF
SOVEREIGN DEBT 49-59 (2007).

See id. at 51.
95.
See Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky & Veerle Opgenhaffen, The Past and Present of
96.
Corporate Complicity: Financing the Argentinean Dictatorship, 23 HARV. HUM. RTs. J.
157, 174 (2010). Nevertheless, "To demonstrate that the loan contributed to the violation
is essential, as there would be no reason to regard a loan as invalid because of an ius
cogens violation committed by one of the parties, the borrowing state, unless this
violation bears a relation to the contract." MICHALOWSKI, supra note 94, at 82.

97.
MICHALOWSKY, supra note 94, at 58. This is feasible as far as a loan is related
to a specific project, as explained in Principle No. 5 of the UNCTAD Principles on
Promoting Responsible Sovereign Lending and Borrowing. See UNCTAD, Principleson
Promoting, supra note 23, at 7. Broadly speaking, creditors should have evidence that
the proceedings are used for the benefit of the population in all international
development agreements. See GGnter Frankenberg & Rolf Knieper, Legal Problems of
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This picture should be completed by a sanction mechanism in force
of which, once debts have been designated as odious/illegitimate by a
specific institution, municipal courts should not enforce the loan
contracts and international financial institutions should deny further

financing to debtors that decide to repay those debts. 98 To avoid all
these problems, a proposal has been formulated regarding the creation
of a framework for accountable sovereign debt financing articulated
into an ex ante component and an ex post component. The first
component should focus on the initial assessment and continuous

monitoring of the loan, while the second component should focus on the
establishment of a tribunal to assess compliance with the ex ante
obligations. 99
B. The Doctrine and its Qualification.
In the view of its supporters, the odious debt doctrine should
invalidate a loan and neutralize the enforcement of the underlying

claims. All this presupposes that the doctrine is normatively
characterized. The flaw is that an intense doctrinal debate is not
enough to turn policy into law. 100 Hence, the legal status of the doctrine

is still an open question and deserves a thorough analysis.
1. The Doctrine as International Law
A first approach consists of qualifying the doctrine as an
international law norm. With respect to customary law, Article 38 of

the Overindebtedness of Developing Countries: The Current Relevance in the Doctrine of
Odious Debt, 12 INT'L J. SOC. L. 415, 434 (1984).
98.
Anna Gelpern, What Iraq andArgentina Might Learn from Each Other, 6 CHI.
J. INT'L L. 391, 413 (2005).
The ex ante component is based on the registration of sovereign contracts by
99.
foreign lenders/investors on a dedicated website to signal the purposed benefits to the
population and the international community. In this way, lenders are called upon to
disclose their engagements with the sovereign counterpart, to require as a condition
precedent that the debtor should indicate the use of the funds, to conduct an audit on
the debtor government and the impact of the contract, and to monitor periodically the
execution of the contract. The ex post component is based on the establishment of a
tribunal to assess whether or not ex ante obligations have been fulfilled. The tribunal
will be composed of independent individuals and shall adjudicate claims filed even by
private persons not party to the transaction. The weak points of this proposal are the
voluntary nature of the registration and the effects of the findings of the tribunal. See
YVONNE WONG, SOVEREIGN FINANCE AND THE POVERTY

oF

NATIONS 134-65 (2012). The

idea to establish an international tribunal to assess the odiousness of a debt had been
already envisaged by SACK, supranote 74, at 163.
100. See Emily F. Mancina, Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God: Resurrecting
the Odious Debt Doctrinein InternationalLaw, 36 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 1239, 125253 (2004) ("To assert, or even prove, that odious debt is bad for the Third World is not
tantamount to a logical integration of the principle into international law.").
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the ICJ Statute stipulates that it amounts to "a general practice
accepted as law." 101 In relation to the material element, the ICJ has
ruled that there must be a constant and uniform usage practiced by

states,1 02 while in relation to the psychological element two approaches
have emerged. First, the existence of this element may be inferred from
103
the very general practice, the literature, or previous judgments.

Second, the existence of this element must effectively be proved. 104
However, with reference to the phenomenon of state succession, since
1945, practice has not recorded significant instances of nonpassing

debt on the basis of the odious debt doctrine. 105 There is an exception,
perhaps, of the debts relating to the Dutch administration of Indonesia

(1949) and the French administration of Algeria (1962).106
With respect to treaty law, the issue arose within the draft articles

on succession of states in respect of state debt. 107 In his Report on the
nontransferability of odious debt, Professor Bedjaoui singled out two
definitions of odious debt: debt contracted by the antecessor state to
serve purposes contrary to the major interests of either the successor

state or the transferred territory; and debt contracted for purposes not
in conformity with international law and, in particular, with the
principles of the United Nations. 108 With specific reference to this
second point, Professor Bedjaoui emphasized that, in terms of ethics,
the odiousness of a debt must be appreciated in relation to human
rights and the right to self-determination, on the one hand, and to the
unlawful recourse to war, on the other. 109 Once it has been established

101. See, e.g., SHAW, supra note 75, at 72-93.
102. Asylum (Colom. v. Peru), Judgment, 1950 I.C.J. 266, at 276-77 (Nov. 20).
103. See Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area
(Can./U.S.), Judgment, 1984 I.C.J. 246, ¶ 90 (Oct. 12).
104. See North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger./Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. 3, at 3241 (Feb. 20).
105. See Andrew Yianni & David Tinkler, Is There A Recognized Legal Doctrine of
Odious Debt?, 32 N.C. J. INT'L L. & CoM. REG. 749, 766-67 (2007) (The lack of invocation
was surprising considering the post-colonization process and the disaggregation of the
Soviet Union and the Federation of Yugoslavia).
106. KING, supra note 45, at 80-82.
107. See Vienna Convention on Succession to State Property, Archives and Debts,
pt. 4, Apr. 8, 1983, 22 I.L.M. 306; 1983 Vienna Convention on the Succession of States in
Respect
of
State
Property,
CENTRE
FOR
INTERNATIONAL
LAW,
https://cil.nus.edu.sg/databasecil/1983-vienna-convention-on-the-succession-of-States6,
2020)
Sept.
visited
(last
in-respect-of-State-property-archives-debt
[https://perma.cc/XG37-AYSY] (archived Sept. 6, 2020) (demonstrating that the
Convention has never entered into force due to its lack of signatory parties).

108. Mohammed Bedjaoui (Special Rapporteur), Ninth Report on Succession of
States in Matters Other than Treaties, [1977] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n. 45, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/301 [hereinafter Bedjaoui, Ninth Report].
109. Bedjaoui made specific reference to debt incurred to purchase arms to violate
human rights through genocide and racial discrimination, to debt incurred to subjugate
peoples and colonize their territories, and to debt incurred to finance a war of aggression.
Id. at 69.
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that a debt is odious, the natural consequence is its nonpassage to the
successor state. Regarding to this, Professor Bedjaoui distinguished

between war debt and subjugation debt. War debt comprised the debt
incurred by the Boer Republic to fight Britain and the debt contracted
by the German Empire after the outbreak of World War I; subjugation

debt comprised the Spanish debt secured by Cuban revenues and the
German debt incurred for the colonization of Polish lands.1 10 However,

the proposal of Bedjaoui was not acknowledged in the final text of the
1983 Vienna Convention; Article 33 simply stipulates that "state debt"

means any financial obligation of a predecessor state arising in
conformity

with

international

law

toward

another

state,

an

international organization, or any other subject of international law.
Nevertheless, the clause "in conformity with international law" would
"

1
leave some room of maneuvering for the odious debt doctrine.

The odious debt doctrine was raised before the Iran-United States
Claims Tribunal 112 in relation to the enforceability of a contract
concerning the provision of military equipment to Iran. 113 The
Tribunal rejected the submission that supply would not have been

beneficial to Iran as when the contract was made the country was not
involved in war activities. Further, the Tribunal found that the odious

debt doctrine was not applicable to the case as it could be invoked only
in situations of state succession and not of change de rigime.114 Apart
from any other consideration, the key point was that, in the view of the

Tribunal, the odious debt doctrine could play a role in relation to state
succession but not to government succession.
2. The Doctrine as a Doctrine

Under a doctrinal perspective, two primary issues arise. The
former concerns the position of Sack's doctrine within the international
law scholarship, and the latter concerns the status of the odious debt
doctrine as an international law doctrine.

With respect to the position of Sack's doctrine within the
international law scholarship, it is worth highlighting that, before the

late

1990s,

Sack's

work was

not much regarded

among the

international law scholars. In his much-praised book on public debt

110. Id. at 72-74.
111. See REX J. ZEDALIS, CLAIMS AGAINST IRAQI OIL AND GAS 42-43 (2010).
112. See generally CHARLES N. BROWER & JASON D. BRUESCHKE, THE IRANUNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL 3-10 (1998).

113. U.S. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 32 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 162 (1996).
114. Id. at 176 ("The Tribunal does not take any stance in the doctrinal debate on
the concept of 'odious debt' in international law. In any event, the Tribunal will limit
itself to stating that the said concept belongs to the realm of the law of State succession.
The revolutionary changes in Iran fall under the heading of State continuity, not State
succession.").
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and debt succession, Professor Ernst Feilchenfeld reported two
instances of odious debt that justified an exemption from the rule of
maintenance: the Spanish debt incurred for taming insurgencies in

Cuba and the German debt incurred for the colonization of lands held
by Polish owners. 115 Both these diversions from the rule of
maintenance had already been reported in Sack's book, but Professor
Feilchenfeld did not feel it necessary to refer to the Russian emigrd as
an authority to reinforce his position. Along the same lines, Professor
Mohammed Bedjaoui did not mention Sack's work when discussing the
doctrine of odious debt in his Report on the Succession of States in
Matters other than Treaties.11 6 This exclusion is surprising as Sack's

work was referred to in the book by Professor Daniel O'Connell on state
succession

in

relation

to

the

description

of

odious

debt.

117

Nevertheless, Sack's exclusion from the Bedjaoui Report may be
explained by the fact that, in his work on public debt and state

succession, Feilchenfeld did not refer to Sack as an international
lawyer, but as an international financial lawyer. 118 In effect, in his
time the Russian emigrd was praised more by economists than by
lawyers.11 9 The fortune of Sack's work changed when in an article
written on the eve of the First Mexican Debt Crisis (1983) Professor

Michael Hoeflich indicated Sack as a leading scholar in the field of
public debt succession.1 2 0 Sack's odious debt doctrine was resumed and
further developed by the debt abolitionist Patricia Adams121 and has
since become topical among antidebt activists, especially in connection
12 2
What is still
with the Jubilee campaign and the Iraqi debt reduction.
lacking is a thorough acknowledgement of it by international
3
lawyers. 12

See FEILCHENFELD, supra note 77, at 329 et seq., 450 et seq.
Bedjaoui, Ninth Report, supra note 108, at 67-74.
117. DANIEL P. O'CONNELL, STATE SUcCESSION IN MUNICIPAL LAW AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 458-59 (C.J. Hamson & R.Y. Jennings eds., 1967).
118. See FEILCHENFELD, supra note 77, at 574-75, 590-92; see also SACK, supra
note 74, at 133-34 (In fact, with reference to state debt succession, Sack underscored
115.
116.

that "Le principe de la succession des dettes publiques est donc un principe, non de droit

internationalpublic reglant les rapports entre Etats, mais de droit financier et de droit
public general"; prophetically he added that "la succession de dettes publiques semble tre
une institution de droit supra-etatique (uberstaatlichesRecht) qu'il appartient d l'avenir
de formuler et d'etablird'une fagon definitive").
119. See Sarah Ludington & Mitu Gulati, A Convenient Untruth:Factand Fantasy
in the Doctrine of Odious Debt, 48 VA. J. INT'L L. 595, 624-28 (2008).
120. See Michael Hoeflich, Through a Glass Darkly: Reflections on the History of
Public InternationalLaw on Public Debt in Connection with State Succession, 1982 U.
ILL. L. REV. 39, 45.
121. See PATRICIA ADAMS, ODIOUS DEBTS: LOOSE LENDING, CORRUPTION, AND THE
THIRD WORLD ENVIRONMENTAL LEGACY 164-67 (1991).

122.
123.

See Ludington & Gulati, supra note 119, at 603-04.
See KING, supra note 45, at 27-28; Margot E. Salomon & Robert Howse,

Odious Debt, Adverse Democracy and the Democratic Ideal, in SOVEREIGN DEBT AND
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With respect to the status of the odious debt doctrine in
international law, the issue is whether and to what extent the doctrine,

as such, has become source of law. Article 38 of the ICJ Statute
enumerates legal scholarship among the sources of international law.
In detail, it stipulates that the teachings of the most highly qualified
publicists of the various nations constitute a subsidiary means for the
determination of the rules of law. 12 4 The mention of academic writings

has a double meaning. On the one hand, it plays the role of filling the
lacunae embedded in international law that is a legal system without
a law-making process comparable to that of national states. 12 5 On the
other hand, it reflects the fact that international law has its origin in

the writings of celebrated scholars-the so-called founders of modern
international law.1 2 6 With the rise of legal positivism the influence of

scholars' writings as a source of international law declined in favor of
custom and treaty where states are the actors of the law-making
process. 127 Although in some ambit of international law, scholars'
writings occasionally still have an influence on the formation of the
law,1 2 8 currently they are mainly referred to in arbitral tribunals and

in national courts to reinforce argumentation.1 29 As an international
law doctrine, the odious debt doctrine should be pled before
international courts and tribunals.1 30 However, because of its unclear
legal contours and its capacity to impair the rule of keeping to
agreements, the doctrine might be confined to cases where the court or
the tribunal are called on to decide ex aequo et bono.131

HUMAN RIGHTS 425, 436 (Ilias Bantekas & Cephas Lumina eds., 2018). Contra WONG,
supra note 99, at 16-18.
124. See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, 1 4; see also Perm.
Ct. Arb. Arbitration Rules art. 35, ¶ 1(a)(iv).
125. International law has no single body capable of producing laws and a
machinery of compulsory jurisdiction to enforce it. This reflects the anarchic status of
world affairs and the conflict between states. See SHAW, supranote 75, at 70.
126. The number counts first all Hugo Grotius, author of the celebrated DE JURE
BELLI AC PACIS (1625), but also Albericus Gentili, Franciscus de Vitoria, Franciscus
Suarez, Johannes Althusius, and Samuel von Pufendorf, to name a few. See ARTHUR
NUSSBAUM, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 58-177 (1947).

127.

SHAW, supra note 75, at 112-13.

128.

This is the case, for example, with GILBERT GIDEL, LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL

PUBLIC DE LA MER (1932), which exerted a great influence on the development of the
concept of "contiguous zone" within the law of the sea.
129. They are used more rarely in the ICJ judgments and opinions to avoid
problematic selection of citations. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL

LAW 24-25 (7th ed. 2008).
130. The only arbitral tribunal before which the odious debt defense was
unsuccessfully raised was the United States-Iran Claims Tribunals in the case U.S. v.
Islamic Republic of Iran, 32 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 162 (1996).
131. Under the ICJ the application of the ex aequo et bono rule is an exceptional
event and depends on the explicit provision of the parties. See generally Free Zones of
the Upper Savoy (Fr. v. Switz.), Judgment, 1930 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 24, at 10 (Dec. 6).
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3. The Doctrine as Soft Law
The present international law picture contains an objective lacuna
in terms of rules applicable to the phenomenon of sovereign debt: there

are neither international conventions regulating this subject 132 nor
established rules in this field.1 33 To fill this gap, certain international
agencies have produced some pieces of soft law.
In January 2012, the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD) adopted the Principles on Promoting
Responsible Sovereign Lending and Borrowing. 134 This adoption
implemented a Resolution by the UN General Assembly stressing the
importance of responsible financing in which both public and private

creditors and sovereign debtors share responsibility for preventing
unsustainable debt situations. 135 The UNCTAD Principles have not
been formally incorporated into a binding instrument for two reasons:
first, this choice is consistent with the soft law characterization of
international financial law; 136 second, the purpose of the Principles is
not so much to establish rights and obligations, but rather to identify
basic rules and best practices. This second reason reflects the dynamic
and flexible nature of the Principles 137 and their nonuniform legal

status. 138 Although some incremental acknowledgement of these

132. But see Vienna Convention on Succession to State Property, Archives and
Debts, supranote 107, at 306.
133. This gap may be filled by having recourse to Art. 96 of the UN Charter under
which the General Assembly may request from the ICJ an opinion on any issue of
international law, including sovereign debt. So far, such a step has not been taken.
Although not formally binding, the interpretative activity of the court may contribute to
promote the progressive development of international law. See Legal Consequences of

the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004
I.C.J. Rep., 136, 213 (Higgins, J.). A set of rules may nevertheless be doctrinally inferred.
See MAURO MEGLIANI, SOVEREIGN DEBT: GENESIS, RESTRUCTURING, LITIGATION 430-61

(2015).
134. Supra note 23.
135. G.A. Res. 65/144, ¶ 3 (Dec. 20, 2010). However, the UN General Assembly
could have adopted a Declaration on Principles of Sovereign Debt, but such a step would
have required a nearly unanimous consent that lacked and still lacks. Cf. HENRY G.
SCHERMERS & NIELS M. BLOKKER, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW 789-90 (5th rev.
ed. 2011).

136.

Chris Brummer, Why Soft Law Dominates International Finance-and not

Trade, 13 J. INT'L ECON. L. 623-24 (2011).

137. See Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky & Carlos Esposito, PrinciplesMatter: The Legal
Status of the Principleson Responsible Sovereign Financing, in SOVEREIGN FINANCING
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 53, at 73, 86.

138. The Principles have been derived by analogy from domestic legal systems.
Only a few reflect customary law (corruption, necessity), while the rest of them may be
classified as general principles of law (agency, authorization, bindingness), emerging
principles (assessment of a borrower's capacity, lender's due diligence), guiding
principles (audits, disclosure of information), or structural principles (avoiding
overborrowing). See Goldmann, supra note 24, at 8.
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Principles in restructuring and litigation may be recorded, it is too

early to qualify them as proper body of legal rules. 139
The UNCTAD Principles do not make specific reference to the
odious debt doctrine. This absence is consistent with the fact that they
aim to be an objective benchmark for responsible sovereign financing.
This aim would be undermined by the acknowledgment of the odious
debt doctrine, the status of which is still unclear. However, a closer
analysis of the Principles may lead to a different conclusion. Under
Principle Number 1, lenders are called to recognize that government

officials responsible for a financial transaction are acting in the name
and on the behalf of the population and hence must refrain from
corrupting them to breach that duty. Moreover, under Principle
Number 2, lenders are required to inform the borrowers of the risks
and benefits of the financial transaction. Further, under Principle
Number 5, lenders financing a specific project are responsible for

making an ex ante investigation of its impact. All this indicates that
the three updated elements of the doctrine are in some way embedded
in these Principles.
By contrast, the updated elements of Sack's doctrine are
straightforwardly acknowledged in the Human Rights Council (HRC)
Guiding Principles on Foreign Debt and Human Rights. 140 The
Guiding Principles, inter alia, push for the establishment of an

international debt workout mechanism to restructure unsustainable
debts and resolve debt disputes in a fair, transparent, efficient, and
timely manner (¶ 84)."1 This mechanism should have the mandate to
rule on the "odiousness" or "illegitimacy" of particular external debts.

The criteria to be used in assessing the odiousness or illegitimacy of a
debt should be defined by national legislation on the basis of the
following elements: the absence of consent by the debtor state's

139. See, e.g., Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky & Matthias Goldmann, An Incremental
Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring:Sovereign Debt Sustainability as a Principle
of Public InternationalLaw, 41 YALE J. INT'L L. ONLINE 13, 38-42 (2016) (noting that
these principles "complement, rather than replace, existing mechanisms").
140. The HRC Guiding Principles are centered on the primacy of human rights, in
particular economic, social and cultural rights, and on their non-retrogression in relation
to state indebtedness. See Human Rights Council Res. 20/23, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/20/23, at
11-16 (Apr. 10, 2011).
141. Id. at 20, ¶ 84. The input for the establishment of a debt workout mechanism
reflects the failure of many proposals for the creation of a machinery for sovereign debt
restructuring, from the IMF Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism to the IIF
Principles for Stable Capital Flows and Fair Debt Restructuring in Emerging Markets.
See MEGLIANI, supra note 133, at 569-79. The HRC Guiding Principles stress the
necessity of filling this lacuna. The UNCTAD is currently working to a Debt Workout
Mechanism to be designed by a Working Group. Sovereign Debt Workout Mechanism,
UNITED

NATIONS

CONFERENcE

ON

TRADE

AND

DEVELOPMENT,

https://unctad.org/en/Pages/GDS/Sovereign-Debt-Portal/Sovereign-Debt-WorkoutMechanism.aspx (last visited Sept. 6, 2020) [https://perma.cc/K23C-E2UH] (archived
Sept. 6, 2020).
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population, the absence of benefit to the debtor state's population, and
the creditors' awareness of this (¶ 86d).142 However, this reference

must be correctly appreciated in the light of the nature, aim, and scope
of the HRC Guiding Principles. In fact, the Guiding Principles are more
political in character than the UNCTAD Principles; they neither
pursue the creation of new rights or obligations under international
law, nor do they replace other mechanisms designed to address aspects
of the sovereign debt problem. Rather, their normative contribution
consists of identifying existing basic human rights standards

applicable to sovereign debt and related policies, as well as in
elaborating the implications of these standards (¶ 17).
4. The Doctrine as a Matter of Politics
The odious debt doctrine has been used as a political argumentwith different outcomes-in the dynamics of debt restructuring. Some

cases can be inferred from the practice.
At the beginning of the new century Argentina was on the edge of
an economic crisis. Economic growth was stagnant, and the cost of
borrowing increased. To meet these imbalances, Argentina requested
the assistance of the IMF against the implementation of a huge

package of fiscal reforms.1 43 However, the cure was not able to defeat
the disease. In late 2001, the economic and political situation
precipitated, and, in December 2001, Argentina declared default on its
debt estimated at $180 billion. Bonded debt, which amounted to nearly
half the outstanding debt, was technically difficult to restructure as it
was articulated in 152 series of bonds, governed by eight different laws,
and held by over 700,000 holders around the world. 1" The
restructuring of the Argentine debt was characterized by a sharp
unilateralism both in form and in substance. First, the debtor did not

142.

According to the commentary, debt restructuring mechanisms should have

the authority to adjudicate claims of invalid or illegitimate debts. The rationale is that
the people of a debtor country should not be required to repay loans from which they
have not benefitted. In alternative, there has to be some form of auditing of the external
debts at the commencement of any restructuring process to ensure that only valid and

legitimate external debts will be included in the restructuring plan and, in that context,
repaid. Human Rights Council Res. 20/23, supra note 140, at 20, ¶ 86(d).
143. Conditions on which the disbursement of the resources depends are attached
to the letter of intent signed by the minister of finance of the requesting state. Formally,
it is a unilateral act of the government; substantively, it is the outcome of intense

negotiations between the staff of the government and the staff of the IMF. This implies
that in case of non-compliance with the conditions, a breach of obligation does not arise,
even though the drawing of resources ceases.
INTERNATIONAL EcONOMIC LAw 614-15 (2008).

See ANDREAS

F.

LOWENFELD,

&

144. Jose Garcia-Hamilton Jr., Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal & Octavio M.
Zenarruza, The Required Threshold to Restructure Sovereign Debt, 27 LOY. L.A. INT'L
CoMP. L. REV. 249, 256-57 (2005).
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encourage the formation of negotiating committees and refused to have
1 45
contacts with those formed at the initiative of some bondholders;

second,

the debtor formalized

a "take-it-or-leave-it" proposal of

restructuring, which involved huge losses for creditors. In September
2003, Argentina launched a first restructuring proposal providing for
the cancellation of 75 percent over the nominal value of the

outstanding debt without any recognition of the accrued interest.
Facing strong opposition by the holders, Argentina reconsidered the
proposal and, in January 2005, launched the final exchange offer
involving a reduction of 75 percent over the nominal value of the
outstanding debt but with a partial recognition of the accrued

interest.14 6 This unilateral approach has many explanations. Among
them is the argument that the debt had been incurred by the
dictatorship and thereby was illegitimate and worthy of repudiation.1 47
Another situation where the odious debt doctrine came into play

was the restructuring of the Iraqi debt. Following the Iraq War and the
overthrowal of Saddam Hussein (2003), the issue of debt relief arose
not out of a sense of humanity or justice, but because of the necessity
to relieve the new Iraq from a heavy burden and so buttress the
democratic process. Although the Iraqi government grounded its
request for debt restructuring on the incapacity to repay the debt, the
US Administration and many debt-abolitionist associations claimed
the debt was to be reduced as it was incurred to finance the war against
48
Iran and the lavish way of life of Saddam Hussein and his entourage.1
In this context, the US Administration exerted a significant pressure

over its allies for a substantial relief of the Iraqi bilateral debt that
amounted to $120 billion.14 9 This reduction took place mainly within

the machinery of the Paris Club,

50

where the Iraqi debt enjoyed

145. Arturo C. Porzecanski, From Rogue Creditors to Rogue Debtors: Implications
of Argentina's Default, 6 CHI. J. INT'L L. 311, 323-24 (2005).
146. This massive debt reduction has few precedents in the recent financial history
and those few involved poor countries, smaller sums, and bank creditors. RODRIGO
OLIVARES-CAMINAL, LEGAL ASPECTS OF SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING 256-59

(2009); see Porzecanski, supra note 145, at 325.
147. To tell the truth, most of the debt was contracted or restructured under the
democratic presidency. See Gelpern, supra note 98, at 408; MICHALOWSKY, supra note
94, at 91-92.
148. Detlev F. Vagts, Sovereign Bankruptcy: In Re Germany (1953), In Re Iraq
(2004), 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 302, 303 (2004).
149. Half of the debt was due to Arab nations. See Ross P. Buckley, Iraq's Sovereign
Debt and Its Curious Global Implications, in BEYOND THE IRAQ WAR: THE PROMISES,
PITFALLS AND PERILS 141, 141-42 (Michael Heazle & Iyanatul Islam eds., 2006).
150. The Paris Club (www.parisclub.org) is the general forum for the restructuring
at multilateral level of bilateral debt owed to industrialized countries. It is an
international conference that has undergone a process of institutionalization: the
elements of institutionalization can be identified in the Secretariat (composed of staff
provided by the French Treasury), the methodological sessions, and tours d'horizon. The
final act of the Paris Club negotiations is the agreed minutes, the typical final act of an
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generous treatment. In this context, the Iraqi debt should have been

rescheduled

under

the so-called

Classical

Terms

that involve

rescheduling at market rate. 151 Instead, this debt benefitted from an
ad hoc treatment implying a cancellation of nearly $30 billion thanks
to diplomatic activism by the United States. 152 The United States'
pressure for a significant debt relief was not confined to Paris Club
participants; it extended to those bilateral creditors that did not

participate in the Club workouts as well as to commercial creditors. 5 3
Although it is unclear to what extent the odious debt doctrine played
an effective role in the debt restructuring process, it is certainly true
that it entered the public debate as a political argument for a
54
significant debt reduction.1
The odious debt doctrine was also evoked in connection with the
restructuring of the Ecuadorian debt. During his campaign for the
presidential election, candidate Rafael Correa promised not to pay
some of the country's external debts, but rather to spend the sums
intended for payment on public sector projects. He affirmed that
Ecuador would be justified in doing so because the bonded debt
represented obligations that had been illegally incurred by previous
oppressive regimes and was therefore unfair and illegitimate.1 55 Once
elected in 2007, President Correa kept his promise and created a Public

Debt Audit Commission to evaluate the country's obligations incurred
between 1976 and 2006.156 The Commission took into consideration

international conference, which are not published. The Paris Club in its activity follows
six principles: solidarity, consensus, information sharing, case-by-case, conditionality,
and comparability of treatment. See Mauro Megliani, Paris Club, in MAX PLANCK
ENCYCLOPEDIAS
OF
INT'L
L.,
https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-97801992316902015)
July
updated
(last
e2176?rskey=x1hvc4&result=l&prd=MPIL
[https://perma.cc/GL6L-Q7JU] (archived Aug. 25, 2020).
https://clubdeparis.org/en/
CLUB,
PARIS
Terms,
Classic
151. See
communications/page/classic-terms [https://perma.cc/3FMJ-JF3D] (arch-ived Aug. 25,
2020) (calling the classic terms the "standard terms" for countries seeking assistance
from the Paris Club).
152. See Buckley, supra note 149, at 146-47 (explaining how vigorous diplomatic
efforts by the United States led creditor countries to forgive 80 percent of Iraqi sovereign
debt).
153. For a detailed description of the Iraqi sovereign debt saga, see WONG, supra
note 99, at 52-64.
154. According to Jai Damle, the most compelling argument for a sharp debt
reduction was based not so much on the odious debt doctrine but rather on the stagnancy
of the Iraqi economy and the instability of the Middle-East, as it was necessary to avoid
setting a precedent in this field. See Jai Damle, The Odious Debt Doctrine After Iraq, 70
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 139, 148, 150-51 (2007).
155. Adam Feibelman, Ecuador's Sovereign Default: A Pyrrhic Victory for Odious
Debt?, 25 J. INT'L BANKING L. & REG. 357, 358 (2010).
156. WONG, supra note 99, at 93-94. The Commission was composed of academic
and anti-debt activists in some way connected to the European Network on Debt and
Development (EURODAD). Id.
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various aspects of Ecuador's external obligations. It found that the
proceeds of various borrowings and restructurings had been used to
unfairly benefit certain internal and external subjects. The
international bonds were found to be invalid because the government

had ceded to oppressive terms of the loan (waiving sovereign immunity,
submitting to foreign law, etc.). Moreover, the service on the debt in
2007 was found to be greater than the public expenditure on health,
welfare, urban development and housing, the environment, and
education.' 57 On the basis of the findings of the Commission, President

Correa made a selective default and declared two out of three
international bonded loans illegal; he also stopped paying coupons
without formally repudiating the loans. 158 Neither the Audit

Commission nor President Correa, however, made any specific
reference to the odiousness of the debts, possibly because the three
criteria of odiousness were not met. 159
5. The Doctrine as Domestic Law
The Guiding Principles on Foreign Debt and Human Rights, in

laying down the three elements of the odious debt doctrine, underscore
that odiousness and illegitimacy should be defined by national
legislation (¶ 86(d)). This is far from being surprising, considering that

one of the major sources of sovereign indebtedness is private loans that
are governed by a domestic legal system usually coinciding with

English law and New York law.1 60
Both the UNCTAD Principles and the HRC Guiding Principles, in
their respective ways, stimulate national legislation to acknowledge
the notion of odious debt in their jurisdictions. A significant step in this
direction might be the elaboration of a sort of model law capable of
constituting a benchmark for national legislation.161 This model law
might be elaborated within UNCTAD as a follow-up to the Principles

157. Feibelman, supra note 155, at 358.
158. WONG, supra note 99, at 94-95. Following the default, the Ecuadorian
government started buying back the bonds at a risible price. Arturo C. Porzecanski,
When Bad Things Happen to Good Sovereign Debt Contracts: The Case of Ecuador, 73
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 251, 266-267 (2010). The success of the Ecuador operation was
also due to the behavior of the trustee of the issuance, which decided not to accelerate
the loan and enforce the bondholder's claims. See Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, The
Coroner'sInquest, 28 INT'L FIN. L. REV., Sept. 2009, at 22, 24-25.
159. The Audit Commission did not find that the debts were not contracted for the
benefit of the population or that the creditors knew of this hypothetical fact; moreover,
the borrowing government was not a dictatorship. See Feibelman, supranote 155, at 360.
160.

Michael

Gruson,

Controlling Choice of Law,

in SOVEREIGN

LENDING:

MANAGING LEGAL RISK 51, 59 (Michael Gruson & Ralph Reisner eds., 1984).
161. The benchmark is constituted by the UNCITRAL Model Law on Arbitration.
See generally U.N. COMM. ON INT'L TRADE L., MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, U.N. Docs. A/40/17, annex I & A/61/17, annex I, U.N. Sales

No. E.08.V.4 (1985) (amended 2006).
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on Responsible Sovereign Borrowing and Lending. As such, the model

law is not binding; nevertheless, states may freely incorporate the
whole of it or some of its provisions in their legislation. Such a step may
contribute to fill an objective lacuna.
In this context, it is worth noting that some states have enacted
legislative measures to curb vulture funds' activism 16 2 in recovering
their claims.16 3 The issue of the illegitimate/odious debt, though, has
not yet become the object of specific legislation. The only exception is
perhaps the US Iraqi Freedom from Debt Act, 164 which underscored
that international precedents exist under which
debts incurred by dictatorships for the purposes of oppressing their people or for
personal purpose may be considered "odious". In cases where borrowed money is

used in ways contrary to the people's interest, with the knowledge of the
creditors, the creditors may be said to have committed a hostile act against the
165
people.

This stipulation constitutes a plain acknowledgment of the Sackian
odious debt doctrine in relation to government succession, but was
confined to the exceptional situation of post-war Iraq. Moreover, the

Act emphasized that such debts might be questioned, but not that they
were per se illegal.
In the absence of specific national legislation addressing this
phenomenon, the only solution is to have recourse to existing norms,
such as abuse of rights, 166 unjust enrichment, 167 and agency. 168

&

162. Vulture funds are investment funds specializing in purchasing the debts of
sovereigns in distress at a price below face value with the purpose of obtaining the
nominal amount in court. On their disruptive activism, especially in connection with the
saga of the Argentine sovereign bonds, see generally Tim R. Samples, Rogue Trends in
Sovereign Debt: Argentina, Vulture Funds, and Pari Passu UnderNew York Law, 35 NW.
J. INT'L L. & Bus. 49 (2014).
163. The most significant of these initiatives is perhaps the 2010 UK Parliament
Debt Relief (Developing Countries) Act. See generally Debt Relief (Developing Countries)
Act 2010, c. 22. Under this Act, a UK court cannot render a judgment, or enforce a foreign
judgment or arbitral award, against a "heavily indebted poor country" under which
private creditors would be enabled to recover their credits in excess of the sustainable
level as calculated under the Heavily Indebted Poor Country Initiative. Id. §§ 3(1), 4(2),
5(1), (3).
164. See generally Iraqi Freedom From Debt Act, H.R. 2482, 108th Cong. (2003).
165. Id. § 2(3).
166. See Frankenberg & Knieper, supra note 97, at 428 (describing "abuse of
rights" as being against the interests of the population or exceeding the sovereign's
natural resources).
167. See Jeff A. King, Odious Debt: The Terms of the Debate, 32 N.C. J. INT'L L.
CoM. REG. 605, 643 (2007) (arguing that unjust enrichment has questionable
applicability to the odious debt doctrine because, by definition, odious debt requires there
be no benefit to the state and thus no enrichment).
168. See Buchheit, Gulati & Thompson, supra note 83, at 1237-45 (describing that
agency law may relieve a "principal" state's obligation to repay a debt in only some
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However, this piecemeal approach does not ensure coverage for all the
elements of the doctrine and is also too dependent on the applicable
law and the seized forum. Against this background, the solution is then

to accept that the odious debt doctrine lacks a proper normative status.
Nevertheless, because the doctrine reflects values and values are
traditionally protected by public policy, it can come into play in the
form of public policy.
6. The Doctrine as Public Policy
Under the law of contracts, a contract cannot be enforced if it is

against public policy. Public policy is usually understood as the "whole
body of laws and legal instruments whose principles cannot be set at
naught either by special conventions or by a conflicting foreign law."1 69
Although it reflects the fundamental economic, social, moral, and
political values of a given country, the content of public policy is subject
1 70
The judge
to variation at different times and in different places.
plays a key role in appreciating the meaning and operation of these

values. In this process, the judge should not follow mass opinion when
it is clearly in error. He is called to direct it, not so much on the basis
of personal convictions, but rather on the ground of the convictions of
the healthy elements of the population that are able to combine respect
for tradition with acceptance of social change.1 71
Against this background, the key point is, first, to understand

whether and to what extent the values protected by the odious debt
doctrine may be subsumed under the umbrella of public policy and,

second, under which category of public policy they may fall. Normally,
contracts are appreciated in the light of the municipal public policy of
the forum. Unfortunately, the values that traditionally come into play

under this policy are the domestic values of the forum. This fact makes
municipal public policy unsuited to acknowledge international values

like those protected by the odious debt doctrine. These values are
better served under transnational public policy.

circumstances, such as when a lender is aware of the "agent" regime's self-dealing
motives).

169. Application of Convention of 1902 Governing Guardianship of Infants (Neth.
v. Swed.), Judgment, 1958 I.C.J. 55, 102 (Nov. 28) (separate opinion by Moreno, J.).
170. Evanturel v. Evanturel, [1874] UKPC 58, 68 (Can.). Public policy is a
"conception the definition of which in any particular country is largely dependent on the
opinion prevailing at any given time in such country itself .... " Payment of Various
Serbian Loans Issued in France (Fr. v. Yugoslavia), 1929 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 20, at 46.
171.

DENNIS LLOYD, PUBLIC POLICY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY IN ENGLISH AND

FRENCH LAW 125-26 (1953).
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IV. TRANSNATIONAL PUBLIC POLICY

The existence of a transnational public policy (or transnational
public order) has been envisaged in certain international commercial
arbitrations and has formed the object of intense doctrinal debate.
From a substantive point of view, transnational public policy
transcends the boundaries of national states. 17 2 Its values come from
many sources: natural law, principles of universal justice, Jus cogens,
and general principles of morality and public policy accepted in
civilized countries.1 73 In addition to the prohibition of corruption that

can be considered a sort of "noyau dur" of the transnational public
policy,1 74 these values include abhorrence of slavery, discrimination,
kidnapping, murder, piracy, and terrorism, the promotion of
fundamental human rights, and the acknowledgement of uniform laws

and codes of practice. 175 However, to reflect a universal moral
standard, a truly international public order value does not necessarily
have to be accepted in all the jurisdictions.1 76 From a systematic point
of view, transnational public policy poses itself alongside municipal
public policy and international public policy.

A.

The Notion of Public Policy

Juristic elaboration has progressively distinguished three types of
public policy: municipal, international, and transnational. Municipal
public policy has the effect of rendering a contract void and

unenforceable. Under common law, a contrast with public policy makes
a contract illegal and thereby unenforceable,1 77 while under civil law a
contrast with public policy makes the consideration unlawful and the
contract void.1 78 In any case, contracts infringing on public policy do

172. Michael Pryles, Reflections on TransnationalPublic Policy, 24 J. INT'L ARB.
1, 3 (2007).
173. JULIAN D.M. LEW, APPLICABLE LAW IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION 534 (1978).
174. JEAN-BAPTISTE RACINE, L'ARBITRAGE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL ET

L'ORDRE PUBLIC 393-94 (1999).
175. LEW, supra note 173, at 535.
176. The condemnation of racial discrimination, corruption, or drug trafficking is
not necessarily

unanimous,

FOUCHARD,

GAILLARD,

GOLDMAN ON INTERNATIONAL

COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 853, 863-864 (Emmanuel Gaillard & John Savage eds.,
1999). In this context, the elaboration of the transnational public policy takes place along
the same lines as that of the general principles of law. RACINE, supra note 174, at 360.
177. Illegality may affect both the formation and the performance of the contract.
See Prentice, supra note 55, at 1224.
178. Article 1131 of the French Code Civil stipulates that "l'obligation... sur une
cause illicite, ne peut avoir aucun effet," Code Civil [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 1131, while
quand elle est contraire . .. a l'ordre
Article 1133 provides that "la cause est illicite ...
public." Id. art. 1133.
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not give rise to claims for specific performance or damages. 179 From a
substantive standpoint, it is possible to distinguish between political
public policy and economic public policy. The former prohibits those
contracts that openly conflict with the social order; the latter prohibits
those contracts that, without infringing on the fundamental values of
the society, affect economic relations. 180

International public policy consists of values that are regarded as
so fundamental by the seized forum that their infringement can block
of a foreign law or the enforcement of a foreign act.181

the application

This policy is stricter in scope and mandate than municipal public
policy; otherwise, the whole private international law system would be
seriously impaired.1 82 In this respect, international public policy is a
misnomer, as it concerns those fundamental, moral, economic, social,

and political interests of the seized forum.'

83

As a result, domestic

courts are less inclined to apply public policy in cases involving an

international element than they are in cases of purely domestic
characterization. 18 4 That implies that "not every rule which belongs to

the ordre public interne is necessarily part of the ordre public externe
ou international."185 This narrowness is reflected in the EU conflict-of-

laws system. Under the Brussels I Regulation, the recognition and
enforcement of a foreign judgment may be refused as far as it is
"manifestly" contrary to the public policy of the seized forum (Articles
45 and 46).186 In the same vein, under the Rome I Regulation, the
application of a provision of the law of a foreign country may be refused
only if that application is "manifestly" incompatible with the public
policy of the forum (Article 21).187

179.

See KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW

380-81 (T. Weir trans., 3rd ed. 1998) (describing the unenforceability of contracts
contrary to public policy in the western world).
180. EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW 142-43 (B6n6dicte Fauvarque-Cosson & Denis
Mazeaud eds., 2008).
181. Mathias Forteau, L'ordre public a Transnational » ou a Reellement
International), 138 J. DROIT INT'L 3, 5 (2011).
182. Vervake v. Smith [1982] 2 All ER 144 (HL) 157 (Lord Simon of Glaisdale)
(appeal taken from EWHC Fam.) (UK).
183. JULIAN D.M. LEW, TRANSNATIONAL PUBLIC POLICY: ITS APPLICATION AND
EFFECT BY INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL TRIBUNALS 20 (2018).

184. See Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 120 N.E. 198, 202 (N.Y. 1918) ("The courts
are not free to refuse a foreign right at the pleasure of the judges, to suit the individual
notion of expediency or fairness. They do not close their doors unless help would violate
some fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent conception of good moral, some
deep-rooted tradition of common weal.").
185.

DICEY, MORRIS & COLLINS, supra note 25, at 1874 (internal quotation marks

omitted).
186. Regulation (EU) No. 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 12 December 2012 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 2012 O.J. (L 351) 1.
187. Rome I Regulation, supra note 25, art. 21.
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Still, international public policy is wider in content than
municipal public policy as it acknowledges some values of the
international community.188 In Oppenheimer v. Cattermole, the House
of Lords refused to apply a foreign law, which constituted a grave
infringement of fundamental human rights. 189 In Kuwait Airways v.
IraqiAirways, the House of Lords refused to enforce a foreign act which
was adopted under a jus cogens violation.190 In Yukos Capital Sarl v.

OJSC Rosneft Oil Co, Lord Justice Rix, delivering the judgment of the
Court of Appeal, which dealt with the public policy exception to the act
of state doctrine, 191 drew a distinction between
the act of State which cannot be challenged for its effectiveness despite some
alleged unfairness, and the act of State which is sufficiently outrageous or penal
or discriminatory to set up the successful argument that it falls foul of clear
international law standards or English public policy and therefore can be
19 2
challenged.

Conceptually

speaking,

these

international

elements

of

international public policy belong to the realm of transnational public
policy or the truly international public order, that "is the one that
establishes universal principles, in various fields of international law
and relations, to serve the higher interests of the world community, the
common interests of mankind, above and sometimes even contrary to
19 3
the interests of the individual nations."

B. The Emergence of TransnationalPublicPolicy
The existence of a truly international public order has been the
object of an intense doctrinal debate. In a course delivered at the Hague
Academy of International Law in 1932, Professor Niboyet evoked the

existence of an "ordrepublic international."The justification for this
peculiar form of public policy lies in the fact that the international
judge has no territorial forum and, therefore, no territorial public
policy to enforce. Substantively, this "ordrepublic international"would
correspond to the public policy of civilized countries capable of

188. International public policy has undergone a process of internationalization.
Forteau, supra note 181, at 9-10.
189. Oppenheimer v. Cattermole [1976] AC 249 (HL) 278 (appeal taken from
EWHC (Ch)) (UK).
190. Kuwait Airways Corp. v. Iraqi Airways Co. [2002] UKHL 19 [114], [2002] 2
AC (HL) 883 (UK).
191. See Yukos Capital Sarl v. OJSC Rosneft Oil Co [2012] EWCA (Civ) 855 [68][69] (Eng.).
192. Id. at [110].
193. Jacob Dolinger, World Public Policy: Real InternationalPublic Policy in the
Conflict of Laws, 17 TEX. INT'L L.J. 167, 172 (1982).
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194
displacing, in case of contrast, the application of municipal law.

Professor Rolin took this point further and specified that the ordre

public international would prevent not only the application of a
conflicting municipal substantive rule but also the application of a
conflicting municipal public policy rule. 195
Currently, the view that identified truly international public order
196
with the common principles of civilized nations is no longer tenable.
In this respect, Maury spoke of an "ordre public de la societe
international"based on customary norms and the general principles of
law,1 97 while Goldman specified that truly international public order

was to be understood as the public policy of the international
community and not as a mere juxtaposition of the common public policy
98
of civilized nations.1

This approach was substantively endorsed in 1986 at the Eighth
Congress of the International Chamber of Commercial Arbitration
(ICCA). In that context, it was acknowledged that not only
international arbitrators, but also municipal judges had in a number

of cases referred to a notion of a transnational public policy capable of
encompassing both the territorial values of the forum and the

fundamental values of the international community.1 99 The existence
of a truly international public order was further acknowledged in the
International Law Association (ILA) Interim Report on Public Policy
as a Bar to Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards (2000). On

that occasion, it was affirmed the existence of a transnational public
policy with universal application that consists of "fundamental rules of
natural law, principles of universal justice, jus cogens in public

international law and the general principles of morality accepted by
2 00
what are referred as 'civilised nations."'

From an axiological point of view, the application of the values of
the international community can be justified by the fact that they
reflect the establishment of a world public order based on respect for

194. Jean-Paul Niboyet, Le R6le de la Justice Internationalen Droit International
Priv4: Conflit de Lois, 40 RECUEIL CoURS 157, 178 (1932).
195. HENRI ROLIN, Vers un Ordre Reellement International, in HOMMAGE D'UNE
GtNtRATION DE JURISTES AU PRtSIDENT BASDEvANT 441, 444 (1960).
196. PHILIPPE FOUCHARD, L'ARBITRAGE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL 399 (1965).
197. JACQUES MAURY, L'EVICTION DE LA LoI NORMALMENT COMPETENTE: L'ORDRE
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL ET LA FRAUDE A LA LOI 141 (1952).

198. See Berthold Goldman, La Protection Internationaledes Droits de l'Homme et
l'Ordre Public Internationaldans le Fonctionnement de la Regle de Conflit de Lois, in 1
RENE CASSIN AMICORUM DISCIPULORUMQUE LIBER 449, 464 (1969).

199. See Pierre Lalive, Ordre Public Transnational(ou Reellement International)
et Arbitrage International,REVUE DE L'ARBITRAGE 329, 329-30 (1986) (Fr.) [hereinafter
Lalive, OrdrePublic Transnationalet Arbitrage International].
200. ALAN REDFERN, MARTIN HUNTER, NIGEL BLACKBY & CONSTANTINE
PARTASIDES, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 420 n. 8
(2004) (citing INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, INTERIM REPORT ON PUBLIC POLICY AS
A BAR TO ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL AWARDS (2000)).
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human dignity.201 Nevertheless, jurists in developing countries have

occasionally perceived these values as a new form of legal colonization
by jurists of developed countries. 20 2
1. Early Cases
Traditionally, the emergence of the doctrine of truly international
public order can be traced back to the ICC Award Number 1110 (1963),
in which Judge Lagergren held that a contract that had as its object

bribery infringed the law of nations. 203 Although the approach used by
Judge Lagergren was quite innovative, it was not the first time that
truly international public policy, in some way, had emerged. This point

was highlighted by Professor Lalive, who recalled two old cases
referred to by Professor Niboyet where the existence of a transnational
public policy, in some way, had been foreshadowed. 2 0 4 The key point is
that, in these two cases, national mandatory rules were applied as
reflecting principles of universal justice that mirrored an emerging
transnational public policy.
The Crdole Case concerned the release by British authorities of

slaves embarked on a US ship that entered the port of Nassau
(1840).205 The ship was sailing from Virginia to New Orleans when,

along the coast of Florida, some of the slaves took control of the ship
and forced the captain to dock at the port of Nassau, a British colony.
As slavery was forbidden by the Slavery Abolition Act of 1833, which
206
the British
had abolished slavery throughout the British Empire,
authorities released the slaves. The United States authorities
protested against this release, and the case was submitted to the
British-US Mixed Commission (1855). The Commission heard the
claim, and, based on the findings, Subarbiter Bates accorded an
indemnity to the US claimants. In his line of reasoning, the Subarbiter

acknowledged, as a matter of principle, that slavery was against the

201. This is the backbone of the so-called New Haven School. See W. Michael
Reisman, Siegfried Wiesner & Andrew Willard, The New Haven School: A Brief
Introduction, 32 YALE J. INT'L L. 575, 576 (2007).
202. With specific reference to the issue of transnational public policy, Andrew I.
Okekeifere, The Enforcement and Challenge of Foreign Awards in Nigeria, 14 J. INT'L
ARB. 223, 237 (1997), underscored that "[j]ust like the concepts of international law of
contract and international mercantile law this new concept is hardly anything short of
an ego trip by a few writers of the developed world eager to impose, for the advantage of
their countries and regions, rules that they are conversant with on the poor less-heard
nations without caring about the sensibilities of the latter's local setting and peculiar
dynamics."

203.

See infra note 214.

204.

Lalive, Ordre Public Transnational et Arbitrage International, supra note

199, at 335-36.
205. Niboyet, supranote 194, at 181-87.
206. Slavery Abolition Act 1833, 3 & 4 Will. 4 c. 73 (Eng.). The Slavery Abolition
Act was anticipated by the celebrated case Somerset v. Stewart (1772) 98 Eng. Rep. 499.
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principles of justice and humanity, but he concluded that, as slavery

was accepted in various countries, it was not against the law of nations.
In other words, the fact that slavery was accepted in a number of
207
countries prevented the formation of general consent against it.
A different conclusion was reached in relation to the Maria Luz
Case. The Maria Luz was a Peruvian ship sailing from China to Peru

with a certain number of "coolies" on board. Following the progressive
abolition of the slave trade, labor-intensive industries-such as cotton
and sugar plantations, mines, and railway construction-were left

without a supply of cheap manpower. To fill this gap, a large-scale
slavery-like trade in Asian (primarily Indian and Chinese) indentured

laborers-the coolies-emerged. 208 Technical problems obliged the
Maria Luz to enter the Japanese port of Kanawaga (1872). The
Japanese authorities asked the coolies whether they preferred to be
freed or to continue their travel to Peru. The coolies chose the first
option and were embarked on a ship to China at the expense of the
Japanese government. Nevertheless, a dispute arose between Peru and
Japan regarding the behavior of the Japanese authorities, which was
later submitted to the arbitration of the Czar Alexander II (1875). The

Czar ruled that the Japanese government bore no responsibility for the
release of the coolies as it had simply applied its own laws and customs
without infringing general rules of international law or particular
treaties. 209 In other words, the Czar, in his award, endorsed the
210
that
application of the overriding mandatory rules of the forum,

displaced the law governing the contract of the semi-enslavement of
the coolies. With reference to international law, the Czar did not say

207. In practice, the legal problem was solved by giving precedence to the lex navis
(the slaves on the ship were under US jurisdiction) over the lex loci (the port of Nassau
was under British jurisdiction). In this respect, Subarbiter Bates failed to apply the
customary rule of the jurisdiction of the coastal state on its internal waters. See GILBERT
GIDEL, LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC DE LA MER: TOME II LES EAUX INT9RIEURES 93-

94 (1932). The decision of the Mixed Commission is reprinted in French in ALBERT DE
LAPRADELLE & NICOLAS POLITIS, 1 RECUEIL DES ARBITRAGES INTERNATIONAUX 704-5

(1905).
208.

Coolies replaced slaves for masters who were gradually losing their labor

force because of the anti-slavery laws. Some of these laborers signed contracts based on

misleading promises, some were kidnapped and sold into the trade, some were victims
of clan violence and sold to coolie brokers, while others sold themselves to pay off
gambling debts. Workers from China were mainly transported to Peru and Cuba. The
Peru coolies were mainly employed in silver mines and guano collecting industry. See
ELLIOTT YOUNG, ALIEN NATION: CHINESE MIGRATION IN THE AMERICAS FROM THE
COOLIE ERA THROUGH WORLD WAR 11 46-58 (2014).
209. See the text of the arbitration in FERDINAND PERELS, MANUEL DE DROIT
MARITIME INTERNATIONAL 93-94 (L. Arendt trans., 1884).

210.

See supra Part II.A.2.
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that the law of nations imposed the liberation of the coolies, but he
implied that that it did not forbid it.211

C. Arbitral Awards
Arbitral practice has provided a significant contribution to the
emergence of the notion of transnational public policy in relation to
transnational contracts. 212 In this context, two different conceptions of
public policy have arisen. The first requires that public policy in
arbitration should coincide with that of the seat of arbitration and the

country where the arbitral award is to be enforced. The second may
provide a better solution. This considers that the power of arbitrators
to adjudicate a dispute derives from all the jurisdictions that are ready
to recognize the award under certain conditions, with the result that
arbitrators should not focus on the public policy of a specific forum, but
21 3
should be guided by fundamental requirements of justice.
In the ICC Award 1110 (1963), the claim concerned the failure to
pay services for a bribing activity under a contract between an
Argentine wheeler-dealer and a German firm.2 1 4 The object of the
contract was the bribery of high officials of the Argentine government
by the Argentine wheeler-dealer to secure, on behalf of the German
firm, a contract for the building of an electric power station. Since the
German firm refused to pay the Argentine wheeler-dealer for his
services, the dispute was submitted to ICC arbitration. Judge

Lagergren, the sole arbitrator, declined to hear the case on the
assumption that "corruption is an international evil; it is contrary to
good morals and to an international public policy common to the
community of nations." 215 In the view of Judge Lagergren, cases
involving gross violations of good morals and international public law
could not have countenance in any court of a civilized country or

211. Cf. infra notes 227-31 and accompanying text (discussing the judgment of the
Japanese court).
212. Stephen Jagusch, Issues of Substantive Transnational Public Policy, in
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC POLIcY 23, 29 (Devin Bray & Heather L. Bray

eds., 2015).
213. An arbitral tribunal sitting in a country where racial or religious
discrimination is part of public policy should not depart from the fundamental rules of
justice embedded in transnational public policy to comply with the rules of the seat,
FOUcHARD, GAILLARD, GOLDMAN ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, supra note 165, at
862.
214. Argentine Engineer v. British Company, ICC Case No. 1110, Award (1963),
reprinted in 10 ARB. INT'L 282 (1994).
215. Id. ¶ 20. Judge Lagergren did not declare the contract null and void, as he
followed the non-separability doctrine between the claim submitted to arbitration and
the arbitral agreement. See id.
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arbitral tribunal. 216 Judge Lagergren could have taken an easier road
and simply declared that the claim was against Argentine law (the law

governing the performance of the contract) and French law (the law
governing the arbitration). Nevertheless, he took the road less
travelled and founded his decision on the public policy of the

community of nations. 217
The issue of a truly international public order has come into play
again in more recent times. 2 18 In World Duty Free Company Ltd v.
Kenya (2006), the claim was based on an act of expropriation of dutyfree complexes at the Nairobi and Mombasa airports by the Kenyan
government.219 During the proceedings, however, evidence emerged
that the agreement for the construction and maintenance of the duty-

free complexes had been tainted with corruption. 220 Since the ICSID
tribunal found that corruption was contrary to the international public
policy of most countries or, in other words, to transnational public
policy, the claims could not be heard. In the view of the ICSID tribunal,
public policy consists of "an international consensus as to universal

standards and accepted norms of conduct that must be applied in all
fora." 22 1 The ICSID tribunal did not declare the contract null and void
but upheld the decision by the Kenyan government to do so. 222

Although the result would have been the same under the domestic
public policy of the applicable (Kenyan and English) laws, the
arbitrators consciously implied that transnational public policy takes
precedence over municipal public policy. 223

The World Duty Free award gained some followers. In 2009, in
EDFv. Romania, the ICSID tribunal held that the request for a bribe
by a state agency amounted to a violation of not only the fair and
equitable treatment rule contained in the Romania-United Kingdom
224
Also, in this
BIT (1995), but also truly international public order.
case, the arbitral tribunal felt it necessary to bring corruption under

the scope of transnational public policy.

216. Id. ¶ 23.
217. Id. The view of Lagergren reflected values of universal justice. See id.
218. See ICC Case No. 3913, Award (1981) & ICC Case No. 8891, Award (1981);
Pierre Lalive, L'Ordre Public Transnational et l'Arbitre International, in NUovI
STRUMENTI DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE PRIvATO - LIBER FAUSTO POCAR 598, 605
(Gabriella Venturini & Stefania Bariatti eds. 2009) [hereinafter Lalive, L'Ordre Public
Transnationalet l'Arbitre International](referring to ICC Case No. 3913).
219. World Duty Free Co. v. Republic of Kenya, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7, Award,
¶ 62 (Oct. 4, 2006).
220. See Cecily Rose, Questioningthe Role of InternationalArbitrationin the Fight
Against Corruption, 31 J. INT'L ARB. 183, 202-04 (2014).
221. See World Duty Free. ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7, ¶ 139.
222. Id. ¶¶ 179, 183.
223. See Moritz Renner, Towards a Hierarchyof Norms in TransnationalLaw?, 26
J. INT'L ARB. 533, 547 (2009).
224. EDF (Servs.) Ltd. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/13, Award, ¶ 221 (Oct.
8, 2009).
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Arbitral tribunals evoked, rather than applied, transnational
public policy in these arbitral awards, because of the nonseparability
doctrine between contracts and arbitration. 225 Once these constraints
were definitively overcome, arbitrators could straightforwardly declare
the contracts on which the claims are based null and void.

D. InternationalContracts in Domestic Fora
In domestic fora, truly international public order values have
generally come into play under the umbrella of international public

policy, to block the enforcement of foreign laws, acts, and decisions.
This does not occur with reference to the enforcement of contractual
claims, because the illegality of contracts is traditionally appreciated
in the light of the municipal public policy of the forum that is scarcely
permeable by international values. Nevertheless, in relation to
international contracts cases, the presence of an international
connecting factor would justify the acknowledgment of certain
transnational public policy values into the domain of the municipal
public policy of the forum. This process would take place along the
same lines as in relation to conflict-of-laws cases where the presence of

an

international

connecting

factor

has

justified

the

gradual

introduction of certain transnational public policy values into the
international public policy of the forum. Such a scenario would imply
a radical change in the content and operation of the municipal public
policy, but it also would introduce a certain degree of uniformity across
domestic fora. 226
In this context, a useful benchmark may be constituted by the

decision rendered by the Japanese court of Kanawaga in the abovementioned case of the liberation of the coolies. 227 The Japanese court
dealt with two specific issues: whether and to what extent the contract
was, first, valid and enforceable and, second, against bonos mores. With

reference to the first issue, the judge held, as a matter of principle, that
a foreign contract should be construed and enforced in accordance with
the lex loci contractus. Nevertheless, the judge stressed that when the

lex fori and the lex loci contractus collide, the latter must yield to the

225. See Ronan Feehily, Separability in International Commercial Arbitration;
Confluence, Conflict and the Appropriate Limitations in the Development and
Application of the Doctrine, 34 ARB. INT'L 355, 355-57 (2018).
226.

See Martin Hunter & Gui Conde e Silva, TransnationalPublic Policy and Its

Application in Investment Arbitration, 4 J. WORLD INV. 367, 368 (2003).
227. See supra Part IV.B.1. The decision rendered by the Kanawaga Kencho on 27
September 1872 is available in English in 1 PAPERS RELATING TO THE FOREIGN

RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 548-52 (1873) [hereinafter Kanagawa Kencho
Decision]. For a historical account see Igor R. Saveliev, Rescuing the Prisoners of the
Maria Luz: The Meiji Government and the 'Coolie Trade', 1868-75, in TURNING POINTS
IN JAPANESE HISTORY 71 (Bert Edstrdm ed., 2002).
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former. In this case, Japanese law forbade not only any kind of
enslavement in Japan, but also the importation and exportation of
slaves in and from Japan. As a result, the contracts entered into
between the Peruvian masters and the coolies were in contrast with
the overriding mandatory rules of the forum, and thereby not
enforceable. 228 With reference to the second issue, the judge found
that, although there was no universal law that made these contracts
void ab initio, they contained features that could not be favorably
acknowledged by countries other than those strictly concerned. As the
condition of slavery was "so repugnant to all sense of natural justice"
that it could be recognized only under a specific law, there was no
obligation under either international law or international comity by a

sovereign state to provide assistance to it. 229 In effect, in delivering his
decision, the judge clearly stated that he had been guided by "broader
principles of natural justice

and equity which are of universal

application." 230 In this way, the judge founded his decision on not only
the territorial rules of the forum, but also the broader values reflecting

transnational public policy. Although these values were not so farreaching to affect the validity of the semi-enslavement contracts, they
23 1
were sufficiently strong to justify the liberation of the coolies.
Although the decision of the Japanese court could be represented
more as a forgotten case than an effective precedent, practice has
recorded some scattered instances where transnational public policy
was applied by municipal courts in relation to international contracts.

In this context, however, it is not always clear whether the national
judge is applying international law norms or referring to international

values. The point is well highlighted in a judgment delivered in 1966
by the Cour d'appel of Paris. 23 2 The case concerned a contract, entered
into in Geneva by two corporations based in Luxembourg, that had as
its object the sale of weapons abroad. The court held that such a
contract was contrary to both French and international public policy

228. The Kanawaga Kencho underscored that these rules reflected an established
policy of the empire under which "no laborers or other persons subject to this government
of enjoying its protection shall be taken beyond its jurisdiction against their free and
voluntary consent, nor then without the express consent of the government." See

Kanawaga Kencho Decision, supra note 227, at 549.
229. Id. at 550. The Japanese decision echoes Somerset v. Stewart, supra note 206,
at 510, where Lord Mansfield held that the status of slavery was so odious that nothing
could be suffered to support it except for positive law, and the laws of England did not
approve it.

Kanawaga Kencho Decision, supranote 227, at 548.
This humanitarian gesture raised Japan's status in the eyes of the
international community. See DOUGLAS HOWLAND, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND JAPANESE
SOVEREIGNTY 33-37 (2016).
232. Cour d'appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, 5 ch., Feb. 9, 1966, Favier
C. Soc. Anderssen, note Pierre Louis-Lucas (Fr.), in 55 REVUE CRITIQUE DE DROIT
230.
231.

INTERNATIONAL PRIVE 264 (1966) (Fr.).
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(namely, transnational public policy). The difficulty in appreciating
this reference to truly international public order is that its sources
were identified with pieces of international legislation in force rather

than with international values. Nevertheless,

a closer analysis

demonstrates that the pieces of international legislation were not
considered in their normative characterization. Rather, they were
regarded in their capacity of expressing-notably but not exclusively-

transnational public policy in the context of the sale of weapons. 233
This issue has been better highlighted in a couple of cases
concerning the sale abroad of works of art. In 1982, the Tribunale of
Turin delivered a judgment regarding the restitution of Peruvian
works of art illegally brought into Italy. Based on the criterion of the
lex rei sitae, the court found that the law governing the transaction was
Peruvian law. Since Peruvian law forbade the transfer abroad of works

of art in the absence of an authorization, the works of art were to be
returned to the Peruvian authorities. In its line of reasoning, the court
held that applying Peruvian law was consistent not only with Italian
public policy, but also with international public policy (namely,
transnational public policy). In detail, the court referred to the rules
contained in the 1970 UNESCO Convention on the Illicit Import,
234
These
Export, and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property.
rules, though, came into play not so much as applicable norms-as at

the time of the purchase of the Peruvian artefacts the Convention had
not yet entered into force-but rather as principles reflecting the
common values of the international community in the field of transfer
of cultural properties. 235 This Italian judgment did not remain
completely isolated. In 1997, the Swiss Tribunal Fedral, in a case
concerning the restitution of a picture stolen abroad, came to the

conclusion that, although the above mentioned 1970 UNESCO
Convention and the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally
Exported Cultural Objects 2 36 were not technically applicable, as they

233. "[C]e traffic est contraire & l'ordre public international, tel que celui-ci est
revele notamment par l'acte general de la Conference de Bruxelles du 2 juillet 1890, article
8, par l'arrangement conclu le 13 ddcembre 1906 entre la France, la Grande-Bretagneet

l'Italie, enfin a la

Convention internationale, conclue le 17 juin 1925, sous les auspices de
la Societe des Nations sur la repressionde trafic d'armes .... " See id. at 265.
234. UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit
Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property Nov. 14, 1970, 823
U.N.T.S. 231, http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=13039&URL_DO=DOTOPIC
&URL_SECTION=201.html [https://perma.cc/WNY7-Z85E] (archived Nov. 20, 2020).
235. See Judgment of 25 marzo 1982, Casa della Cultura Equadoriana c. Damusso
e Altri, 18 RIVISTA ITALIANA DI DIRITTo INTERNAZIONALE PRIVATO E PROCESSUALE 615

(1982).
236. UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects, Jun.
U.N.T.S. 457, https://www.unidroit.org/instruments/cultural1995, 2421
24,
property/1995-convention (last visited Sept. 6, 2020) [https://perma.cc/BC7J-KLXU]
(archived Sept. 6, 2020).
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had not yet been ratified by Switzerland, their norms "relevent d'une
commune inspiration [et] constituent autant d'expressions d'un ordre
public international en vigeur ou en formation." 237

Despite their scantiness, these cases indicate that municipal
judges have not hesitated to acknowledge a wider notion of public
policy capable of embracing the fundamental values of the
international community and to deny the enforcement of international
contracts infringing these values. 238 In this context, it is worth
highlighting that international contracts, nowadays, are a wide notion
not confined to contracts between parties in different countries, but
excluding only those situations where no international element is

involved or, in other words, where all elements are connected to a
single country. 23 9

Applying this empirical approach to sovereign loans involves
overcoming the traditional division between the economic and the legal

definition of sovereign debt. The economic definition focuses on the
residency of the creditors: the debt is internal when creditors are
resident within the borrowing state; it is external when they are

resident outside. The legal definition impinges on the characterization
of the loan contract: the debt is foreign when the loan is denominated
in a foreign currency, launched on foreign markets, submitted to a
foreign law or jurisdiction; it is domestic when none of these connecting

factors is present. 240 The result is that only domestic loans in the hands
of internal creditors would escape from being qualified as international
loan contracts. This picture, potentially, would enlarge the operation
of transnational public policy in relation to sovereign debt.

237. Lalive, L'Ordre Public Transnational et l'Arbitre International, supra note
218, at 604 (quoting UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural
Objects, supranote 236).
238. Pierre Lalive, Transnational (or Truly International) Public Policy and
InternationalArbitration, in COMPARATIVE ARBITRATION PRACTICE AND PUBLIC POLICY
IN ARBITRATION 257, 286 (Pieter Sanders ed., 1986).
239. The international character of a contract may be defined in a great variety of
ways. The solutions adopted in both national and international legislation range from a
reference to the place of business or habitual residence of the parties in different
countries to the adoption of more general criteria, such as the contract having
"significant connections with more than one State," "involving a choice between the laws
of different States", or "affecting the interests of international trade". Although the
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts do not expressly
acknowledge any of these criteria, the general assumption is that the concept of
"international" contracts should be given the broadest possible interpretation, so as
ultimately to exclude only those situations where no international element at all is
involved; i.e., where all the relevant elements of the contract in question are connected
with one single country. See UNIDROIT, UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS 1 (2016).
240. See MEGLIANI, supra note 133, at 4-5.
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E. Odious Debt and Transnational Public Policy
In terms of illegitimate/odious debt, two connected issues arise:
whether the odious debt doctrine can be subsumed under the umbrella

of transnational public policy, and whether, once a debt is declared
illegitimate/odious, restitutionary remedies are available.
In relation to subsumption under transnational public policy, the
Sackian view pursuant to which a debt must be odious not only in the
view of a government, but also in that of the family of nations, ideally

places the odious debt doctrine in this context. 24 1 Nevertheless, this
qualification is to be tested. In this respect, it is necessary to draw a
distinction between situations where the financial transaction is
tainted with corruption and situations where no corruptive activity
emerges. In the first case, the financial transaction is considered
collateral to the corruptive activity and follows its fate.242 In the second

case, it is questionable whether transactions not affected by corruption
but by mere "odiousness" may be declared illegal and unenforceable.
The reading of the World Duty Free arbitration may offer some
guidance in this regard. In the view of the arbitral tribunal, bribery
was contrary to transnational public policy "[i]n light of domestic laws
and international conventions relating to corruption, and in light of the
decisions taken in this matter by courts and arbitral tribunals."24 3
These are the benchmarks against which to ascertain the subsumption
of the values protected by the odious debt doctrine under transnational

public policy. In terms of national law, some pieces of legislation are
specifically aimed at curbing the judicial activism of vulture funds, 244
but this is a very different issue from considering a loan contracted
without the consent of the population, not for its benefit and in the

awareness of the creditors to be illegal. In terms of international
conventions, no international instrument regulating this phenomenon
has so far been drafted, even though two pieces of soft law can be
recorded: the UNCTAD Principles Promoting Responsible Sovereign
Lending and Borrowing and the HRC Guiding Principles on Foreign
Debt and Human Rights (¶ 86(d)). 24 5 In the first, the three elements of
the odious debt doctrine are in some way embedded in the text; in the
second, the odious debt doctrine is expressly mentioned, but with the

241. See SACK, supra note 74, at 162.
242. "[C]laims based on contracts of corruption or on contracts obtained by
corruption cannot be upheld by this Arbitral Tribunal," World Duty Free Co. v. Republic
of Kenya, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7, Award, ¶ 157 (Oct. 4, 2006).
243. Id.
244. See Debt Relief (Developing Countries) Act 2010, c. 22 (U.K.). Further, there
is a 2008 Belgian law meant to prevent funds appropriated by the Belgian government
for development co-operation from becoming an object of attachment by creditors of
recipient states. See DEVI SOOKUN, STOP VULTURE FUNDS LAWSUITS 88 (2010).
245. Supra Part III.B.3.
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indication that it should be formalized through national legislation. On
the one hand, this picture reflects the failure of a proper normative

characterization of the doctrine; on the other hand, it indicates an
emerging principle capable of gaining progressive acceptance.

In terms of arbitration, the only case in which the doctrine has
been applied is the so-called Tinoco arbitration. 24 6 The case concerned
the validity of a loan contracted by Frederico Tinoco, President of Costa
Rica, with the Royal Bank of Canada following the coup d'dtat of 1917.
In January 1917, Tinoco was Secretary of War under President Alfredo
Gonzalez. On the grounds that Gonzalez was seeking presidential
reelection in violation of a constitutional limitation, Tinoco used the

army and navy to seize the government and assume the provisional
headship of the Republic. He, then, called a presidential election and
became the new president of Costa Rica, but soon he lost the favor of
the population and was obliged to relinquish power. Over this period,

the sums provided under the loan contracted with the Royal Bank of
Canada were used for the personal expenses of President Tinoco and
his kinship. Because of this, the successor government did not
recognize the loan, and the United Kingdom, acting in diplomatic

protection on behalf of the Canadian bank, agreed with Costa Rica to
submit the controversy to arbitration. Umpire Taft, the Chief Justice
of the U.S. Supreme Court at the time, held that the Canadian Bank
did not behave in good faith in its lending activity and thereby Costa
24 7
The Tinoco arbitral
Rica had been right in repudiating the loan.

award, however, does not contain all three of the traditional elements
of the doctrine, as Tinoco was democratically elected. 248 Moreover, this
is a "vintage" case, too old and isolated in the arbitral practice to
constitute a precedent. 249
All this picture indicates that, to this day, the acknowledgment of
the odious debt doctrine within transnational public policy is not well

established but is still a process in formation. Nevertheless, this does
not preclude courts and tribunals from applying the doctrine and
contributing to its formalization.
In relation to the availability of restitutionary remedies, it is again
necessary to draw a distinction between cases in which the transaction

246. See Aguilar-Armory & Royal Bank of Canada (Gr. Brit. v. Costa Rica), 1
R.I.A.A. 369, 394 (1923).
247. "The case of the Royal Bank depends not on the mere form of the transaction
but upon the good faith of the bank in the payment of money for the real use of the Costa
Rican Government under the Tinoco regime. It must make out its case of actual
furnishing of money to the government for its legitimate use. It has not done so." Id. at
394.
248. See Sarah Ludington, Mitu Gulati & Alfred L. Brophy, Applied Legal History:
Demystifying the Doctrine of Odious Debts, 11 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 247, 26263 (2010).
249. See Lee C. Buchheit & G. M. Gulati, Odious Debts and Nation-Building:When
the Incubus Departs, 60 ME. L. REV. 477, 482 (2008).

20201

MOZAMBICAN ILLEGAL LOANS

1685

is tainted with corruption and cases in which it is not. When a
transaction is tainted with corruption, the doctrine of the unclean
hands bars the recovery of what has been transferred under the
contract, as the policy of discouraging corruptive activity is considered
prevailing over the policy of avoiding unjust enrichment. In this case,
it is superfluous to make an inquiry into the legal status of the odious
debt doctrine. By contrast, when the transaction is not tainted with
corruption, the availability of the restitutionary remedies depends on
the legal status of the doctrine. Even assuming that the doctrine may
have some public policy characterization, the general rule is that a
claim for the recovery of money lent based on unjust enrichment can
be barred only in rare cases.

However, the sanction of denying restitutionary remedies can be
reasonable to the extent that creditors coincide with those who have
partaken in the corruptive activity or the odious transaction. This is
certainly the case of transactions with bankers, just like those declared
invalid by the Mozambican Constitutional Council. By contrast, this

can scarcely be the case of bonded loans where the holders of the bonds
do not coincide with those who have taken part in the corruptive or
odious activity. This involves that restitutionary remedies can hardly
be refused to bondholders.
V. CONCLUSION

The controversy surrounding the Mozambican loans has opened
the Pandora's box on the validity and enforceability of sovereign loans
and guarantees lacking a proper authorization and tainted with
corruption as well as on the availability of restitutionary remedies. As
these transactions are contracts with private parties, these issues

should be appreciated in the light of domestic law and before national
courts. These two factors would determine the outcome of lawsuits. To
avoid fragmentation, a possible solution is to have recourse to a
uniform benchmark: the odious debt doctrine.
Under the odious debt doctrine, a sovereign loan or guarantee is
invalid as long as it is incurred without the consent of the population
and not in its interest with the awareness of the creditors. The legal
status of this doctrine, though, is still uncertain. Failing a proper
normative characterization, it may come into play in the form of public
policy. Normally, public policy is meant to protect the fundamental
values of the forum. As the odious debt doctrine protects international
values, its ideal collocation could be under the umbrella of
transnational public policy that serves the common interests of
mankind.

In the case of international contracts, to the realm of which
sovereign loans and guarantees with private parties belong, the
presence of an international connecting factor can justify the
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contamination of the parochial public policy of the forum with the
values protected by the transnational public policy. In this context, it
is plainly acknowledged that when an odious debt is incurred on the
basis of an upstream corruptive activity, the illegality of this latter
impinges upon the former and restitutionary remedies are unavailable.
What remains an open question is whether and to what extent the

values protected by the odious debt doctrine are per se subsumable
under transnational public policy. The conclusion is that, to this day,
this process of subsumption is still at an early stage. Nevertheless, this
does not preclude courts and tribunals from applying the doctrine and
contributing to its formalization.

